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THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND SELFCENSORSHIP IN LEGAL DISCOURSE
David M. Smolin*
I want to direct attention to . . . the peculiar division between academic
and religious thought in our culture . . . . Our fears of religious oppression, and perhaps our fears of religious truth, lead us to maintain a false
ideology. . ..

There is a presumption in some circles that the Judeo-Christian
tradition is not an appropriate authority in legal discourse.' This view
is best exemplified by those most aware of what we lose by such an
exclusion. The late Professor Arthur Leff, for example, candidly stated
that the death of God has destroyed any possibility of creating normative systems, including legal systems.3 Indeed, Professor Leff appears to
have stated that even Hitler's regime cannot definitively be condemned
without reference to God. 4 The insight that the death of God is the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. B.A., New
College of the University of South Florida (1980); J.D., University of Cincinnati (1986). The
author wishes to thank Howard Bromberg, Michael Debow, Scott Houser, Jack Nelson, Desiree
Smolin, Barry Vaughn, Howard Walthall, and George Wright for their review of and comments
on drafts of this article. I also want to thank Jay Hinton, Rhonda Pitts, John Stemberger, and
Stephen Strickland for their research assistance.
1. White, Response to Roger Cranton's Article, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 533 (1987). While
Professor White was directly addressing the role of religion in law school classroom discussions, I
understand him also to be alluding to the wider concern of this article: the role of religion in legal
discourse generally, including scholarly discourse.
2. The banishment of religion and theology from the academy in general, and the law school
in particular, is acknowledged and to some degree bemoaned in a recent set of articles in the
Journal of Legal Education. See Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
509, 516 (1987); Elkins, Reflections on the Religion Called Legal Education, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
522, 526-28 (1987); White, supra note 1.
3. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1232.
4. Id. at 1249. Bernard Murchland, in his review of Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virtue,
similarly notes that students in his course in ethical theory rarely are able to relate their emotional
horror at Hitler's acts "to any recognizable ethical theory or tradition. In other words, they cannot
give reasons for what they feel." Murchland, Rediscovering Morality, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 29,
1982, at 60 (discussing A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (lst ed. 1981)).
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birth of moral relativism dates at least to Nietzsche.5 Of interest, however, is Leff's logic. Leff moves from the premise that God is undiscussable in a law journal article to the conclusion that humans are left
alone to create law themselves.' Refusing to discuss someone, of course,
does not support a conclusion that he doesn't exist. Modern thinkers,
however, often reason in this manner; they begin by assuming God's
irrelevance and end by proclaiming, however sorrowfully, His death.'
Leff's lament is not atypical: Theoretically, the exclusion of God has
eliminated the possibility of creating a normative legal system; 8 practically, "[n]either reason, nor love, nor even terror, seems to have worked
to make us 'good,' and worse than that, there is no reason why anything should." 9 Left's paper ends with the words "God help us." 10
There is something strange about declaring God the only possible
source of help, and then declaring even the possibility of His existence
off limits for discussion. Just as ironical is Leff's only stated reason for
rendering God, and His relation to law, undiscussable: that the question of "whether or not He exists and can ground [a legal or ethical
system] . . .is not something that can be decided here.""1 Yet, if Leff
is correct, nothing can be decided here-in a scholarly journal-except
that nothing can be decided. 12 Yet our inability to definitively "decide"
issues clearly hasn't stopped anyone from writing about them. What,
then, is it about God that makes Him undiscussable?
This paper is an attempt to demonstrate the necessity and legitimacy of discussing God, and the Judeo-Christian tradition, in American legal discourse. This thesis runs against the grain of deeply held
assumptions, as exemplified by Professor Left's assumption that "obviously" such subjects cannot be settled, and hence discussed, "here."' 3
Our refusal to discuss God here-in the scholarly journals in particular, in legal discourse generally-separates us from much aid that He

5.
JONES,

See, e.g., F. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 6 (T. Common trans. 1933); W.
A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, KANT AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 253 (2d ed.

1975).
6. Leff, supra note 3, at 1233, 1249.
7. Cf A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 195-96 (1987). "Nietzsche replaces easygoing or self-satisfied atheism with agonized atheism, suffering its human consequences." Id. at 196. Professor Leff finds the death of God simultaneously joyous and sorrowful.
"The result of that realization is what might be called an exhilarated vertigo, a simultaneous
combination of an exultant *We're free of God' and a despairing 'Oh God, we're free.' " Leff,
supra note 3, at 1233.
8. Leff, supra note 3, at 1232-33.
9. Id. at 1249.
10. Id. at 1249.
11. Id. at 1232.
12. See id. at 1232-33, 1245-49.
13. Id. at 1232.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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might otherwise render us. More importantly, it tends to separate the
operational legal system, which must decide profoundly troubling moral
questions, from His aid. We begin by assuming that God is undiscussable in a scholarly journal, and end by making decisions profoundly
touching people's lives without His aid, based on our unexamined conclusion that we are all we have. The assumption that we should exclude
God from legal discourse, once examined, proves itself to be both irresponsible and false. Or such it is my task to demonstrate to what is no
doubt an audience of doubting Thomases.
Part I of this paper examines at some length the proposition that a
society without objective values is inherently tyrannical. This case has
been made many times, often very eloquently, by others. Indeed, the
lament of our inability to affirm objective values has become a virtual
chorus. 4 Nonetheless, the predominance of legal theories built on a relativist foundation suggests the neod for a thorough-going demonstration that such theories are inherently flawed.
Many eloquent laments for our lost sense of values collapse when
they move to the constructive task of identifying or creating those objective values which we as a society can and should affirm. Part II of
this paper begins with an introductory section discussing the methodological problems associated with discourse between persons of disparate perspectives. This section addresses the question, intrinsic to my
thesis, of how the theistic believer addresses the nonbeliever. Part II of
the paper then seeks to demonstrate that American legal scholars who
do not personally believe in God, or in the validity of substantive
Judeo-Christian morality, are nonetheless required by their own standards to assume the authoritative nature of the Judeo-Christian tradition in American legal discourse. The format of this demonstration is
an analysis of the Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment traditions in the
context of American history and culture.
I.

RELATIVISM AND TYRANNY

Some forty years ago C.S. Lewis wrote, "A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny
or an obedience which is not slavery.' 5 Variations of this thought can
be found in the writings of current legal scholars.'" Yet, most modern

14. See, e.g., R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT (1975); A. BLOOM, supra note 7, at
195-96; A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); Christenson, Uncertainty in Law and Its
Negation: Reflections, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 364 (1985).
15. C. LEwis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 46 (MacMillan ed. 1947).
16. R. UNGER, PASSION 47 (1984); Christenson, supra note 14, at 364. These writers state
that the failure to agree to substantive content reduces the legal process of conflict-resolution to
just another form of power struggle. The implication is that the winners of such conflicts will have
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legal scholars have preferred to construct legal theories that avoid questions of objective values. 17 These attempts to avoid substantive value

judgments arise from skepticism regarding the supportability and plausibility of such truth-claims.' 8 Yet against this skepticism stands the

accusation of Lewis, and others, that without such claims any political
or legal system necessarily is tyrannical.
The inevitability of domination without objective values can be
demonstrated as follows. Assume that values choices are mere personal
preferences, and that there exist no criteria by which to judge the
truthfulness or moral correctness of any such preference. Given such a
relativist position, many nonetheless hold to autonomy and freedom as
the ultimate values. 9 Actions can then, at least, be judged wrong if

furthered their own interests by dominating the losers, an apparent form of tyranny. These writers, however, do not necessarily believe that such agreement necessitates an agreement to objective
values; mere agreement is arguably all they require.
17. John Hart Ely's procedural theory of Constitutional interpretation, for example,
ridicules the notion that fundamental values are discoverable, and thus seeks to develop a theory
of judicial review which relies on the text of the Constitution interpreted in light of the court's role
in protecting the political process. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-88 (1980). Dworkin's theories, sometimes viewed as representative of the natural law tradition, are perhaps based
on his conviction that "political decisions, must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life." R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985). Arguments regarding who ought to have the authoritative voice in resolving
conflicts which pose questions of objective value can and do arise among those who believe such
values to be both discernible and available. Many modern legal scholars, however, appear to approach the issue from exactly the opposite perspective: they assume that objective values are nonexistent, and then wonder who ought to be left with the authority to resolve value conflicts. The
two time-honored responses, represented here by Ely and Dworkin, are the majority through their
representatives (except where the people have previously defined a right or the political process
has been hampered), and the individual. Believing value choices to be essentially irrational and
subjective can therefore lend itself to any answer along the interpretivist-procedural-activist range
of judicial review theorists, depending on whether one desires to locate the ultimate authority for
values choices with either the individual or the majority's representatives. The latter choice can be
argued, of course, on a purely utilitarian basis. Cf Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 879-80, 903-06 (1987) (suggesting that a Holmesian judicial deference to democratic
power politics is inconsistent with republicanism and overlooks the practical failings of majoritarianism). But certainly the position that the individual has the inalienable right to make values
choices precisely because no standard exists by which such choices may be objectively judged
stands natural rights theory on its head; it is based on a skepticism icy enough to support legal
positivism. Indeed, such a theory in effect considers skepticism itself to be the overriding "natural
law" position.
18. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 17, at 879-80, 904-05 (noting relation of skepticism, as
exemplified by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), to various modern theories of law); J. ELY, supra note 17, at 43-72 (ridiculing view that
courts can discover fundamental values).
19. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 191. Dworkin's principle that "political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life," id..
effectively enthrones individual autonomy as the ultimate value. As a definition both of what it
means for a government to treat its citizens as equals, and what it means for government to treat
all its citizens as free, this principle of "neutrality" resolves the tension between equality and

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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they impermissibly interfere with the autonomy or freedom of others.
Of course, the choice of autonomy as an ultimate value is itself arbitrary; a true relativist would have to admit that the preference for freedom and autonomy over tyranny and domination is itself an arbitrary
preference. Nonetheless, it is a preference that most people appear to
share. Positing autonomy as the ultimate value is very appealing, because it appears to permit one to argue that relations among persons
can be ordered in regard to a preference that all or most of us share,
without resort to other, more divisive, value choices. A political theory
that can give us both freedom and productive, peaceful, ordered relations with others has obvious appeal. America, moreover, was founded
on the belief that freedom is better than tyranny.2"
Your freedom ends, however, at another's nose. The key problem
in constructing procedural theories of law is distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible infringements of another's freedom.
These theories attempt to regulate conflict between persons without regard to objective values. In order to do so, theorists construct and interpret what they perceive to be the procedural rules of the game. Political, economic, and personal relations are conceived as arenas in which
the theorist can only define fair rules of competition, cooperation, and
conflict.
We live in a world of scarcity. In the resolution of conflicting
desires for scarce resources and services, as well as conflicting value
preferences, the human condition dictates that there will be winners
and losers. A theorist's procedural rules for determining winners and
losers can be contrasted to the hypothetical condition of nature, where
brute force is the only rule of law. The so-called natural condition
clearly fails to maximize the over-all freedom of persons, because the
constant state of war minimizes the production of wealth, which is the
source of economic freedom, and minimizes security in one's person
and life, which is the basis of all freedoms.2 ' The hypothetical condition
of nature is, however, both relativist and procedural. It is relativist because it posits no particular value preference as objectively correct. It is
procedural in that it contains a mechanism for resolving conflicts
among persons: that of brute force. The condition of nature, however, is
inimical to those who view freedom and autonomy as the ultimate
value both because it fails as a system to maximize the freedom of
persons, and because its mechanism of conflict-resolution is intrinsically

freedom and thereby enthrones a single principle-individual autonomy-as the ultimate value of
liberal political morality. See id.
20. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
21. See, e.g.. T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 104-09 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. ed. 1958) (1st ed. 1651).
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tyrannical. A system that resolves conflicts over values and goods
through force places the principle of tyranny-brute force-over that
of freedom.
The rules of the game, therefore, must both maximize freedom
and provide a mechanism of conflict resolution which is not intrinsically
inimical to freedom and autonomy. The second task, that of providing a
mechanism of conflict resolution that is not inherently tyrannical, is
apparently impossible without positing objective values in addition to
freedom and autonomy. This fundamental point can be made by examining the position of the person or group who lose a particular conflict,
whether it be a conflict over goods and services, or a conflict concerning
value choices. Any such loss amounts to a loss of freedom; the individual's or group's will has been frustrated. A theorist must nevertheless
be able to demonstrate to such losers that his or her methods or principles of conflict resolution are intrinsically compatible with freedom,
and must be able to do so without regard to other values that might
cast light on the substantive correctness of the results of the conflict.
The method of conflict resolution must, to use a popular term, have
legitimacy. The loser should be made to feel like the boxer who, upon
being defeated, shakes hands with his opponent with the assurance that
it was after all a fair fight, and the best man has won; if the loser
believes that the referee has been bought off, the results of such conflict
will clearly be illegitimate.
Some critics of procedural theories of law clearly believe that the
referee has been bought off. They argue that legal rules are indeterminate, and that courts in applying such apparently neutral rules consciously or unconsciously make their decisions upon other, hidden, and
thus illegitimate, bases: usually a favoritism of the rich and powerful,
but for some theorists, equally illegitimately a favoritism of the poor
and marginalized.
More fundamentally, however, modern theorists find domination
intrinsic even to systems where the referee faithfully carries out the
mandate of clear, determinate rules. This domination occurs because of
the arbitrariness of choosing between different procedural or conflictresolving rules, the choice of which impacts on likely winners and
losers. Thus, a basketball league has the choice of crediting a team for
either two or three points for shots made beyond the thirty-foot marker.
Either rule is capable of being enforced in a determinate, neutral manner. The adoption of the three-point rule, however, clearly favors teams
with players gifted at long shots, as opposed to teams not so fortunate.
The choice between the rules requires an evaluation as to the most relevant criteria for evaluating basketball teams: for example, what should
be the relative importance of long-shot ability, as opposed, for example,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2

19881

SELF-CENSORSHIP IN LEGAL DISCOURSE

to a strong "inside" game of tall, strong short-shooters? We make the
same kind of judgments as teachers when we determine the relative
importance of rule memorization or analysis, and allocate examination
points between stating the rule and applying it.
Procedural rules are not neutral in the sense that they determine
the criteria by which substantive decisions will be made. The loser of a
particular conflict can thus argue that, even though the referee determinately and neutrally has applied the rules, the rules themselves are
inherently illegitimate and tyrannical because they favor those with
characteristics not possessed by him or her. The defenders of the system are then forced to argue that the favored characteristics are appropriate. For example, it has been argued that certain tests used in educational and vocational settings favor those with a knowledge of
standard written English and those with a knowledge of middle-class
white culture, thus discriminating against poor, black persons. The
losers, disappointed applicants to a police department, for example, are
essentially claiming that those favored characteristics are not as important to the job of an officer as the test's framers believed them to be.2 2
However difficult such an issue may be, the framer of a general theory
has an even greater task: to determine the relevant characteristics of
human beings for the purpose of creating rules which will settle all
conflicts over goods, services, values, and behavior.
America's primary set of political procedural rules can be summarized under the term representative democracy.a Americans, however,
have recognized from the outset that tyranny can be accomplished
through representative democracies, just as it can be accomplished
through the rule of absolute despots. Thus, if our hypothetical basketball league is governed under democratic principles, and a majority of
teams, through their representatives, vote for the three-point rule because they each lack tall players while enjoying an abundance of good
outside shooters, then the minority of teams voting against the three
point rule, who will likely suffer many defeats because of it, have suffered under the well-known tyranny of the majority. 2 America's "solution" to the problem of majoritarian political tyranny has included constitutional limitations protecting minorities against certain majoritarian

22. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (purposeful discrimination not shown by
differential impact of written objective test on black applicants for employment as police officers).
Even if the Supreme Court is correct in its application of the equal protection clause to this
situation, the question of whether the test is fair, as opposed to whether it is constitutional, requires a demonstration that the test identifies characteristics relevant to employment as a police
officer.
23. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 17, at 5.
24. Cf id. at 7-8.
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abuses of power. These constitutional provisions, many of which are
inherently open-ended and ambiguous,2 8 are given their authoritative
interpretation by nine appointed individuals. Thus, America's solution
of the problem of majoritarian tyranny opened the door to the tyranny
of the minority over the majority, and of nine (or five) Supreme Court
justices over the nation. These dangers, moreover, were perceived from
the very beginning.2 6 The reason this problem has not been solved is
simply that it is insoluble. As Professor Ely notes, one cannot simply
2
say that the majority rules but the majority does not rule. Proposed
solutions, like that of Professor Ely, offer guidance on when the majority will and will not win, but do not, and cannot, answer the charge of
despotism from the losers of particular conflicts.
America's procedures for determining wealth production and distribution encompass both the so-called free market and our political
processes. Our private economic processes, and our political processes,
are symbiotically joined. 2 a The markets could not function as they do
without the frameworks established by the government: frameworks including the definition and punishment of theft, the maintenance of
peace through non-violent methodologies for distributing political
power and settling civil disputes, the provision of important infrastructures and services such as roads and fire departments, the regulation of
industries and of markets themselves. America's complex economic and
political system implicitly and effectively defines those human characteristics which will be determinative of wealth.
The degree to which, for example, human need and human productivity are the bases of wealth distribution presents the same sort of
fundamental dilemma as whether the majority or minority governs.
The substantive value of autonomy or freedom cannot determine
whether productivity or need, in a given conflict, is more important,
because that value, taken alone, is so vague as to be usable by any of
the adversaries. Those who lack what they need can claim a loss of
freedom, even if they are unproductive; those who receive less than
they produce can claim a loss of freedom, even if they live in luxury
and possess far more than others. Thus, without agreement on the relevant characteristics by which conflicts over goods, services, behavior
25. See, e.g., id. at 11-41.
26. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885,
902-13 (1985) (anti-federalists claimed proposed Constitution would produce the despotic rule of
the federal judiciary).
27. J. ELY, supra note 17, at 7-8.
28. Cf. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (discussing relation of
property and sovereignty); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 873 (arguing that Lochner defined neutrality by market ordering under the common law and exploring an alternative neutrality defined by
New Deal principles).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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and values should be settled, the loser-whether in America, the Soviet
Union, Sweden, or some hypothetical utopia--can always claim that
the rules identified the wrong characteristics, and therefore that the
enforcement of such rules, against his or her will, constituted an act of
tyranny.
The standard response to this dilemma of choosing relevant characteristics without positing values other than freedom is to posit a system based on consent of all its members. The initial mechanism of consent provides a foundation for developing a set of rules that will
subsequently resolve conflicts, and determine winners and losers. The
reply to the loser is that his or her loss is not an act of tyranny or
domination because he or she at some earlier time had freely consented
to be bound by such rules. The present use of force to guarantee the
winner his or her spoils is thus not an act of tyranny, but an act wholly
consistent with the premise that freedom and autonomy are the only
substantive values enthroned by the system.2 9
The essential problem with systems of consent is that they are either hypothetical, in which case one can manipulate the position from
which the consent was given, or else actual, in which case the consent is
contaminated by the circumstances of its procurement. In any event,
the original position from which the consent is procured can, like other
procedural rules, be arbitrarily varied so as to produce different results.
Thus, in John Rawls' original position persons must arrive at a consensus as to society's rules without knowing their individual characteristics. Persons must deal without knowing whether they will be mentally
retarded or mentally gifted, mentally disturbed or mentally stable.3"
Richard Posner, on the other hand, specifically rejects Rawls' original
position, stating that "[t]o treat the inventor and the idiot equally so
far as their moral claim to command over valuable resources is concerned does not take the differences between persons seriously . . .""
".
Theories of consent thus become the ultimate procedural rules, and the
original position from which consent is procured can be manipulated in
conformity with the theorist's view of the relevant characteristics by
which conflicts over goods, services, values, and behavior should be

29. For example, under the interpretivist theory of judicial review, a court striking down a
statute answers the charge of being undemocratic by arguing that the people had consented to be
bound by the Constitution. See J. ELY, supra note 17, at 8-9 (quoting Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975)).
30. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-37 (1971).
31. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 128
(1979). My comparison of Rawls and Posner as a means of demonstrating the arbitrariness of
autonomy-based procedural theories follows Professor Left's analysis. See Left, supra note 3, at
1243-45.

Published by eCommons, 1987

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13:3

settled.3 2

Hypothetical theories of consent also suffer from the positing of a
certain rational process by which all persons, according to the theorist,
should make their decisions." The imposition of this process of thought
by the theorist on the human race as a whole is in itself a value

imposition.
Theories of actual consent often possess elements of mythology
and symbolism rendering them closely akin to theories of hypothetical

consent. America's Declaration of Independence, for example, declares

that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the gov-

erned.34 Yet, as Professor Ely has noted, our fundamental political document, the Constitution, was ratified and made binding over all Ameri35
cans despite substantial and fervent opposition. More fundamentally,
subsequent generations were bound, so that our system creates the tyr36
anny of one generation over all subsequent generations. The notion,
then, that America has a social compact to which all have consented to
be bound cannot be taken too literally.
To the degree, however, that theories rely on the actual positions
of persons as the starting point for negotiations, the theories adopt a
value judgment that such starting point is just. Thus, Posner rejects
Rawls' hypothetical starting position in favor of one that includes the

32. Thus, it has been argued that Rawls' requirement that persons in the original position
deal free from any moral convictions and commitments implies a particular, highly debatable
conception of the person, or else a particular, highly debatable conception of the good; in either
event, Rawls has failed to define principles of justice which are impartial as to differing moral and
religious traditions. See Perry, A Critique of the "Liberal" Political-PhilosophicalProject. 28
WM. & MARY L. REV. 205, 206-19 (1987). 1 agree with this critique. Indeed, it would seem that
a theory of justice which seeks to deal equally or neutrally between opposing religious, philosophical, and moral convictions is impossible simply because some of those traditions teach the necessity of not being neutral; by choosing the neutrality principle one has already chosen a substantive
principle opposed by some of the traditions toward which one is supposed to act neutrally. See
also A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUsTICE? WHIcH RATIONALITY? 3-4 (1988).
33. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 137, 142-43, 153-56, 168-72 (persons in original

position, bargaining behind the veil of ignorance, must bargain conservatively, and without regard
to their conception of the good). For criticisms of Rawls' approach, see supra note 32.
34. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
35. J. ELY, supra note 17, at 6. Professor Ely notes that
once the Constitution was ratified virtually everyone in America accepted it immediately as
the document controlling his destiny. Why should that be? Those who had opposed ratification certainly hadn't agreed to such an arrangement. It's quite remarkable if you think
about it, and the explanation has to be that they too accepted the legitimacy of the majority's verdict.
Id.
36. See id. at 1I. In article V of the Constitution, the founding generation appropriated to
itself the power to define the restrictive terms under which future generations would be permitted
to amend America's fundamental compact. Seen in this light, this century's free and creative
interpretation of the Constitutional text can be perceived as a successful coup by later generations
against the power the deceased founding generation had claimed for itself.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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actual characteristics of persons as a relevant characteristic. Posner
thus characterizes Rawls' philosophy as involving a redistribution of
wealth that is an improper interference with the autonomy of individuals-referring apparently to the talented and strong individuals whom
he views as naturally possessing property. a7 By adopting the actual
wealth-producing characteristics of individuals as the original position
(by which the original distribution of property is made), Posner effectively determines that wealth-producing characteristics, rather than
need, are the relevant human characteristics. The choice between an
actual and a hypothetical original position from which this preference
of characteristics ensues, however, is itself a value-imposition. Put another way, persons who consent with a gun held to their head have not,
by at least some moral accounts, truly consented. Nature has clearly
put the gun to the head of, for example, the down syndrome child, and
circumstances arguably have done the same for certain poor persons.
The fact that the more fortunate can extract a consent to almost any
terms from the less fortunate does not necessarily mean that tyranny
and domination are not at work.
Theories of consent, moreover, are vulnerable to the uncertainties,
psychological and philosophical, attendant to the very concept of consent. The value of a theory of consent is that it posits free acts, rather
than forced acts, as the ultimate basis of conflict resolution. Yet many
clearly believe persuasion to be merely the most insidious form of domination: that of one mind over another. 38 Thus, under one view a woman
who "consents" to a traditional marriage has been persuaded, through
her upbringing and culture, in such a way that her consciousness itself
has been dominated and invaded. The internalization of values through
the persuasive processes of compulsory education, socialization, and
child-rearing make the very idea of a free consent problematic. The
process of throwing off these internalized restraints raises the question
of trying to separate one's supposedly true self from the entire history
of other persons' attempts to influence us. 9 Once we succeed in remov-

37. See supra note 31.
38. Maclntyre describes how members of the Bloomsbury group used various forms of intimidation to win philosophical arguments. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 17.
39. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART 78 (1985) [hereinafter R. BELLAH]. Thus, leftist critical theorists seek to overcome "false
consciousness." When you have overcome, do you reach true consciousness, or must all consciousness by definition be false? See Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal
Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought. 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 229 n.132
(1984); see also id. at 213-30. Erich Fromm noted the problem as follows:
[A]uthority can appear as internal authority, under the name of duty, conscience, or
superego . . . the development of modern thinking from Protestantism to Kant's philosophy, can be characterized as the substitution of internalized authority for an external one.
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ing these shackles (if such a thing is even possible), we must somehow
"freely" respond to the clamor of conflicting voices that address us."'

Arguably, anytime we "agree" with another human being, that person
has, through force of will, personality, or intellect, dominated us."' The
task is made more complex by the equally clamorous, equally conflicting voices within. Without any ordering system we will soon find ourselves enslaved to this chaos. On another level, there are those who will
tell us that we only have the illusion of making free choices, as we are,
after all, merely a determined part of the great cause and effect ma-

chine."' The free, autonomous self choosing in the void, uninhibited by
either. outside forces or a definitive self, may be an inaccurate description of who we are as human beings. Yet any other version of the self
that we can construct is arguably incapable, in the full sense of the
word, of truly consenting.
A completely free self anyway appears arbitrary and unattractive

to many. Such a self must make decisions based on mere preferences,
yet has no basis-even in itself-from which to prefer anything."

With the political victories of the rising middle class, external authority lost prestige and
man's own conscience assumed the place which external authority once had held . . .the
conquest of his natural inclinations, and the establishment of the domination of one part of
the individual, his nature, by another, his reason, will or conscience, seemed to be the very
essence of freedom. Analysis shows that conscience rules with a harshness as great as external authorities, and furthermore that frequently the contents of the orders issued by
man's conscience are ultimately not governed by demands of the individual self but by
social demands which have assumed the dignity of ethical norms. The rulership of conscience can be even harsher than that of external authorities, since the individual feels its
orders to be his own; how can he rebel against himself?
E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 166-67 (1941). On the role of law in shaping private preferences, the ambiguity of the concept of autonomy, and the inadequacy of private preferences as the
basis for social choice, see Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129 (1986).
40. Bob Dylan expressed one variation of this dilemma in the following lyrics:
You lose yourself, you reappear/ You suddenly find you have nothing to fear/ Alone you
stand with nobody near/ When a trembling distant voice, unclear/ Startles your sleeping
ears to hear/ That someone thinks/ They really found you. A question in your nerves is
lit/ Yet you know there is no answer fit to satisfy/ Insure you not to quit/ To keep it in
your mind and not forget/ That it is not he or she or them or it/That you belong to.
B. DYLAN, It's Alright Ma (I'm Only Bleeding), in WRITINGS AND DRAWINGS 172 (1973).
41. Cf Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205,
211-13 (1979) (fundamental contradiction); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (individualism versus altruism); Gabel & Kennedy, Roll
over Beethoven. 36 STAN L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing repudiation of the fundamental contradiction and philosophical discourse; intersubjective zap as descriptive of a sudden experience of
connectedness).
42. See, e.g., B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971); cf B. RUSSELL, MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 47 (1929) ("[Human] origin, . . . growth, . . . hopes and fears, . . . loves, and
beliefs are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms.
...
), quoted in C. Becker, THE
HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

43.

PHILOSOPHERS 13-14 (1932).

Thus, Allan Bloom, speaking of University students, notes: "They can be anything they
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Many prefer to view humans as having definitive, free selves, which

become more of what they, in essence, really are even as they freely
choose. This view posits the self as having substantive characteristics

capable of maturation. A self chooses well, under this view, when it
makes choices consonant with the needs of the substantive self to ma-

ture and grow. A society which maximizes freedom, under this view, is
one that maximizes the best conditions for such growth to occur.4
Such a society can then be justified under a consent theory because all
selves that make choices based upon their best interests would consent

to its rules.
Maturational theories of the self, however, are inherently problematic. First, although substantive theories of the human self, including
theories of growth, have been posited, such theories in fact contain implicit value assumptions. To place one's value system into a theory of
the self is an attempt to transpose value questions into fact questions.45
The attempt may be admirable, but the descriptive evidence simply
does not allow a choice of one such theory over another, apart from
one's preferences for the values implied by each theory. C.G. Jung

claims that individuation is the highest human activity, 46 while sociobiology posits the propagation and survival of our genes as our fundamental purpose or function.47 Freud subscribes to the sexual and death

want to be, but they have no particular reason to want to be anything in particular." A. BLOOM,
supra note 7, at 87. Maclntyre, who analyzes this view of the self in relation to Sartre's and
Erving Goffman's work, notes: "This democratized self which has no necessary social content and
no necessary social identity can then be anything, can assume any role or take any point of view,
because it is in and for itself nothing." A. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 32; cf.5 W. JONES, A.
HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 341-42, 351 (2d ed. 1975) (Sartre portrays the free, authentic self as having no reason to do one thing rather than another).
44. This sort of substantive view of the self, though partially obscured by equivocation and
ambiguous terminology, is what underlies Unger's work. See Note, Roberto Unger's Theory of
Personality, Law, and Society: Critique and Proposalfor a Revised Methodology, 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 423 (1986) (authored by David M. Smolin, the present author).
45. Maclntyre rejects the fact-value distinction posited by this statement. See A.
MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 57-59, 83-84. Maclntyre is apparently correct that factual premises do yield value conclusions in the context of a teleological, functional description of human life.
If we know the true nature and end of human beings, the chasm between factual and value statements is bridged. The distinction is appropriate, however, as Maclntyre would acknowledge, to a
relativist mindset; it is used here as part of an illustration of the results of such a mindset for legal
discourse. Theorists who ridicule the non-rational, non-empirical foundations of theistic moral systems often claim to derive their "morals" from the hard rock of data and logic. Such claims jump
ahead of the available evidence; in this sense they disguise leaps of faith (answers to value questions) as discovered facts.
46. See, e.g., C. JUNG, MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS 196-97 (Vintage Books ed. 1965);
C. JUNG, The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious, in THE PORTABLE JUNG 121-38
(J. Campbell ed. 1971).
47. See, e.g., J. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW (1985); R. DAWKINS. THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
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instincts," Unger to self-assertion,49 and Maslow to self-actualization, 50
as the primary or highest drives of human life. Until and unless we are
blessed with the knowledge of what is truly best for each human self,
our opinions in such areas amount to the imposition of our view of what
is best for others, upon those others. 1 Such knowledge, moreover, is
unobtainable through natural means, because such means do not permit us to look beyond the grave. We cannot truly know what is good
for human beings unless we are aware of their ultimate and eternal
destinies, and the view that the grave is our only afterlife, so that life
should be actualized only in terms of its potentialities for this life, is
itself an unprovable unassumption not necessarily shared by, 52 and not
properly imposable upon, our fellow human beings.
The second reason that maturational, substantive theories of the
self cannot be used to construct tyranny-free social systems is that they
depend, as must other supposedly value-avoiding systems, on a maximization doctrine. Theorists of the self may attempt to construct a
society that will maximize the growth or maturation of individual
selves, just as theories based on autonomy as the only objective value
may, as mentioned above, try to justify a particular scheme of procedural rules on the basis of freedom maximization. Thus, for example,
wealth maximization, in the form of efficiency, is arguably a secondary
goal derived from the primary goal of either human freedom or human
growth. Wealth maximization has frequently been used to construct or
support a set of procedural rules, i.e., the rules governing the "marketplace." The problem with all theories of growth, freedom, or wealth
maximization, however, whether based in self-psychology or law and
economics, is that the theories require implicit or explicit choices between different freedoms, which in turn require just the sort of values

48. See, e.g., E. FROMM, supra note 39, at 182 (Freud's later theories considered sexual
libido and death instinct as two basic human strivings).
49. See R. UNGER, supra note 16, at vii, 3-5, 20-22, 95-100; Note, supra note 44, at
427-31.
50. J. NASH, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 500-03 (1970) (citing A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954)).

51. Unger's proposal, for example, that society become more flexible is built upon his belief
that the growth of faith, hope,and love depend on the loss and sacrifice of our "settled place in a
settled world." His gamble is that destabilizing society and thus demanding loss and sacrifice of
its members will produce more faith, hope, and love than disbelief, despair, and distrust. See
Note, supra note 44, at 438-39 & n.86 (quoting R. UNGER, supra note 16, at 73). Because Unger
has failed to demonstrate the truth of his premise about human nature, his proposal for society
amounts to an imposition of his personal preference for personal and societal flexibility upon a
largely unwilling populace. See generally Note, supra note 44.
52. See, e.g., GALLUP REPORT No. 236, RELIGION IN AMERICA, 50 YEARS: 1935-1985, at
53-54 (1985) (seventy-one percent of Americans believe in an afterlife; seventy-one percent believe in heaven and fifty-three percent in hell).
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choices the theories were designed to avoid. For example, let us assume
that we possess the resources to either provide a single middle-aged
man of great learning and aesthetic appreciation with goods, services,
and leisure equal to his high capacity for enjoyment and appreciation,
or else support twenty orphaned children with a nutritionally adequate
diet and enough shelter and clothing to make it likely that they will
grow into reasonably healthy adults. There is no doubt that taking
away our gentleman's scenic views, fine foods and wines, and impressionist paintings could, on one view, sharply diminish his freedom, as
well as his opportunities for growth. It may well be that what this gentleman is able to experience while, say, viewing his Reniors, or looking
out at the sea from his beachside home, or using his leisure time to
reread Goethe, or Shakespeare, represents achievements of the self far
beyond those of which the rest of us are capable. Would a system that
took away his servants, property, and leisure and put him to work to
raise the essentials for our twenty orphans have, overall, lessened or
increased either freedom or growth? The answer to this question, of
course, requires one to place freedoms (or satisfactions) in a listing of
priorities, to assign values to various activities within this hierarchy,
and then to decide the relative priority of spreading out freedoms
among people as compared to allowing a few to attain the highest levels
of human growth and satisfaction. All three of these steps are fraught
with the very value choices that a maximization theory is designed to
avoid. There is certainly a view of human freedom available that suggests that a system that feeds the needy incapable of feeding themselves, by reducing the luxury of wealth-producers, has attained a
greater overall level of freedom even if the G.N.P. of the nation has,
through lowered incentives, been reduced. Freedom and growth, in
other words, can be defined in a number of ways, and the ways we
define them reflect value choices not inherent in the concepts themselves. Maximization theorists try to tell those who lose conflicts that
the common good demanded this result; the easy reply is that any petty
tyrant can make the same claim.5 3
We have seen that Lewis, and others, are right: a system not based
on objective values is inherently tyrannical, precisely -because the lack
of objective values means that the ruled-and in particular the ruled
who lose conflicts concerning goods, services, behavior, and values-have in one way or another been dominated and defeated through
the force and will of the rulers and winners. A system based on objective values, however, can say to the loser: It was right that you lost. I,

53. He who rules in the name of the common good, and is free to define that term, rules
with absolute and tyrannical power.

Published by eCommons, 1987

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13:3

the ruler, I, the winner, have not defeated you, but rather this true
moral principle, which objectively rules us both, has determined that
you shall lose this particular conflict 5 If there are no objectively true
moral principles, then conflict within a society is, as Alasdair
Maclntyre has noted, in one form or another a civil war, or as Unger
has noted, a brutal and amoral power struggle.15 Only objectively true
moral values truly allow there to be a form of government that is not in
one way or another a form of tyranny.
II.
A.

THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND LEGAL DISCOURSE

Introduction: On Discourse Between Persons of Disparate Views

The problem of discourse between persons of disparate views
emerges as the problems of presupposition and common ground.
Presuppositions are those first premises from which all else is inferred
or deduced. Discourse between persons of disparate views is often useful in revealing the disparate presuppositions which underlie other disputes. The question then becomes: how does one get beyond a simple
and basic conflict in presuppositions? The answer is to search for some
common ground: a principle neutral in the sense that all participants
will accept it as a criterion of either the true, the good, or both. The
hope is that argumentation from a shared premise will lead to agreement, either because the shared premise will come to be seen as a more
fundamental presupposition than those premises that are not shared, or
else because the discussion based on shared premises will somehow persuade one or both participants to modify their disparate
presuppositions.
The argument in Part I of this paper proceeded by assuming that
most readers would find common ground in the presupposition that tyranny is bad. The argument thus sought to demonstrate that relativism
must also be bad. (That which produces evil is itself evil, is the inference.) Finally, objective values are introduced both as the opposite of
the bad (relativism), and as, by logical demonstration, the only means
of avoiding evil (tyranny). The inference, therefore, is that objective
values are good.

54. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 8-9.
55. See id. at 253; R. UNGER, supra note 16, at 47. Arguably, Macintyre and Unger require mere moral consensus in a society to avoid the situations they describe and deplore. It is,
moreover, entirely possible that a society could produce moral consensus without possessing objectively true moral values: either the society could hold its values to be objectively true, and be
wrong, or the society could agree to affirm certain values on the basis of a shared sense of subjective preference. Ultimately, however, if the values themselves are not objectively true, tyranny has
occurred; the losers (and the human condition dictates that there are always losers) will have been
persuaded to "consent" on the basis of a falsehood, or at least without the benefit of the truth.
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The relativist may make a number of replies. First, the relativist
may state that a demonstration that objective values are good or useful
fails to show that they exist or are true. Those relativists whose presuppositions include the nonexistence or nondiscoverability of objective values are apt to rephrase the problem of tyranny as follows: Given the
lack of valid objective values, how do we resolve conflicts between persons of disparate values? The relativist is likely to argue that more evil
(tyranny) will be produced by pretending that objective values exist,
then by owning up to the truth that they don't. Second, some relativists
may argue that objective values are not really a good, but are in fact
an evil. This is true, the relativist might argue, because the agreedupon evil, tyranny, has as its opposite the foundational good of individual autonomy. Individual autonomy is only possible, however, where
there are no objective values; objective values are inherently limiting to
the desire of the individual to create his own values. The common
ground of the objectivists and the relativists, their purported joint distaste for tyranny, was therefore illusory, for the two define the term in
fundamentally conflicting ways: The objectivist defines tyranny in opposition to the good of living under objectively valid values, while the
relativist defines tyranny in opposition to the good of individual autonomy, which, as defined by at least some relativists, requires that there
not be objectively valid values.
The objectivist may attempt to regain common ground by defining
tyranny specifically in terms of the subjugation of one person by another. This definition of tyranny, however, only underscores the disparate assumptions regarding the existence of objective values: the objectivist assumes objective norms, and therefore holds certain losses by
persons to be mandated by the objective norm, not by the arbitrary will
of another person; those who assume that objective norms are not available must assume that all such attributions to objective norms disguise
the imposition of one will upon another. The attempt to find common
ground can therefore be labeled a failure.
The discussion in Part I nevertheless serves several useful functions. First, it demonstrates that the relativist is incapable, in the formal sense, at least, of constructing a legal system that avoids the tyranny of some persons interfering with the autonomy of others. The
relativist who values individual autonomy thus must concede at least a
measure of self-contradiction, and thus tragedy, in his system. 5 Second, this demonstration should encourage the badgered objectivist, who
has been told by the relativist that his attempts to impose "his" values

56. Cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1358 (2d ed. 1988) (noting tragic nature of life and law in regard to resolution of abortion issue).
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on society through law constitute tyranny. The objectivist should know
that, based on his own presuppositions, he furthers tyranny precisely
when he abandons the attempt to make objective values the basis of the
law. Indeed, the objectivist should know that his views offer the only
real hope of a system that in principle (if not in actual practice) completely avoids the subjection of one person by the arbitrary will of another. The objectivist also learns that his rock-throwing opponent lives
in a house with a good deal of glass, for the relativist legal system
must, even by its own terms, fail to solve the problem of the subjugation of one person by another.
My argument is thus far dependent on the existence and discoverability of objectively valid or true norms. Unknown or nonexistent objective norms cannot serve the function of avoiding tyranny by resolving conflicts between persons. The defeat of individual autonomy
through a principle that is widely embraced but not objectively true or
valid can in formal terms constitute no more than the subjugation of
the individual by the group: clearly a form of tyranny. Thus, if objectively valid and true norms and values are not discoverable, the argument in Part I is useless.
By necessity, then, I must go on to argue that objective norms
exist and are discoverable. While it might be possible to argue the
point in the abstract, this would serve little purpose: the bare fact that
such norms exist and are discoverable are useless to us until we can
point to those norms, or at least to the materials and methodology by
which the norms will be ascertained. My task for Part II of this paper
will thus be to demonstrate that the Judeo-Christian tradition constitutes the source materials for the discovery of objective norms.
Addressing myself first to fellow Christians, I can, based on the
common presuppositions that Christianity is both good and true, urge
that what is good and true should be accepted as the basis of American
law. This is not as simple as it at first sounds, for many Christians have
been persuaded by the relativists that no one set of norms, particularly
religious-derived norms, should form the basis of our legal system, even
if they are in fact true and good. Part I of this argument is therefore
particularly relevant when I address Christians, because it demonstrates the necessity of basing the law on what is in fact actually true
and good, and because it demonstrates that the relativist has not solved
the problem of tyranny. Part II will be relevant to the Christian because it argues that relativism is not only tyrannical in principle, but
that the use of relativism and individual autonomy as guiding principles
of American law has produced, and is producing, real subjugation of
actual persons in the specific context of twentieth-century American
life.
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The more difficult question, however, is how the believer addresses
the nonbeliever. The nonbeliever by definition does not believe that
Christianity is true; some nonbelievers may find part or even all of
Christianity to be good, while others will believe it to be principally
bad. The argument addressed to the non-Christian therefore must
search for some common ground as a basis for arguing either that
Christianity is true, or that Christianity is good, or both. The argument
that Christianity is good, moreover, must take the specific form that it
would produce good (defined in the nonbeliever's terms) to apply Christian norms in our legal system.
An attempt to demonstrate the truth of Christianity invokes a
venerable discussion: the relation between reason and faith. If Christianity can be shown to be true based on a reasoning process that is
common to believer and nonbeliever, then a method of discourse that
will not be defeated by ultimately contrary presuppositions is open. If
Christianity is based on irrational faith, however, then how can those
with this faith ever address those without it?
Relying at this crucial juncture on the Reformed tradition of
Christian doctrine and apologetics, I will argue as follows. First, reason
cannot truly serve as a common ground between believer and nonbeliever, for much the same reason that'a common concept of tyranny
fails to serve as common ground: the term means different things to
believer and nonbeliever, and thus does not truly constitute common
ground. From the theist's perspective, reason centers around God; to
the nonbeliever, reason centers around, in one fashion or another, the
human mind. For the theist, God himself is the criterion of what is
reasonable, just as God is the criterion of what is true; thus reason
which denies God is by definition unreasonable. It would be illogical for
the Christian to accept reason as a separate criterion of whether God
exists, for then reason, rather than God Himself, would constitute the
ultimate criterion of truth. Thus, even discourse that demonstrates that
God probably exists is by definition illogical and unreasonable, for God
himself is the criterion and author of all reason, making the mere possibility that He could not exist an illogical absurdity. What the nonbeliever asks for from the Christian is an admission that a specific methodology of thought-various reasoning processes that by definition are
separate and independent of God-be accepted by the Christian as the
ultimate arbiter of their dispute over whether God exists. For the
Christian to accept this dare is to accept a criterion that by definition
embraces the presupposition of the nonbeliever and specifically rejects
his own presupposition. This amounts to intellectual suicide.
Reformed doctrine substantiates the above argument. Reformed
doctrine acknowledges the revelation of God to man, in creation, man,
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and scripture, to be clear and plain and thus admits to no rational
doubt that God exists. The denial of God's existence, power, and goodness therefore derives not from the evidence, which is plain, but from
the depraved nature of man. God's gift of faith is not a product of
additional information given to the believer; instead, God gives believers a new nature capable of accepting that which He has already
clearly revealed concerning Himself. God Himself, operating as the
third person of the Trinity, the Spirit, testifies in the believer's heart to
the truth of what God Himself has previously revealed in nature, man,
and scripture. Thus, the ultimate criterion of truth for man is not
man's reason, which in its depraved state is wont to deny and suppress
knowledge of God, but God Himself, who testifies within the human
heart to His own power and goodness.
The theist from this perspective cannot expect any criterion, such
as reason, which by definition is autonomous and separate from God, to
serve as a common ground between believer and nonbeliever. The theist
testifies, through the power and will of God, to God; God is the beginning and end, and can admit of no criterion above or beyond Himself. 7
The theist therefore cannot expect to be able to demonstrate in the
nonbeliever's terms and based upon the nonbeliever's presuppositions
that the God revealed in scripture exists, for the ultimate criterion of
the nonbeliever must by definition exclude and deny the existence and
governance of this kind of God. The theist may, however, argue in
terms borrowed from the nonbeliever for a separate purpose: demonstrating the destructive, self-contradictory nature of presuppositions
that deny God. Thus, Part I of this paper sought to demonstrate, in
formal terms, that a relativist legal system, which by definition denies
God's existence and governance, and which tends to define as its chief
good the maximization of human autonomy, must of necessity fail to
solve the problem of safeguarding human autonomy from the subjugation of other autonomous persons.

57. The following works on Reformed doctrine and apologetics, which show remarkable
substantive consistency over a period of some 450 years, are representative of some of the best
works of this tradition, and are germane to the points raised in the text: J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF
THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 35-99, 241-348, 537-621 (J. McNeill ed.; F. Battles trans. 1960); J.
EDWARDS, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, in 2 THE WORKS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS
(J. Smith ed. 1959) [hereinafter WORKS]; J. EDWARDS, Freedom of the Will, in 1 WORKS, supra
(P. Ramsey ed. 1957); J. EDWARDS, Original Sin in 3 WORKS, supra (C. Holbrook ed. 1970); J.
FRAME, THE DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (1987); C. VAN TIL, THE DEFENSE OF THE
FAITH (3rd ed. 1967); THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, chs. I, VI, VIII, IX-X, reprinted
in 3 P. SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 600-73 (4th ed. 1884). Romans 1:18-:32 is one of
the most frequently noted scriptural passages concerning the plainness of God's revelation of Himself in nature, and the consequent responsibility of those who reject Him.
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Part II of this argument will similarly argue that, in the context of
American law, it is, in the nonbeliever's own terms, tyrannical and selfcontradictory for those involved in legal discourse to censor discussion
and use of the Judeo-Christian tradition. The argument concerning tyranny has essentially two components: First, given the historical and cultural centrality of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the supposedly
democratic nature of our institutions, it is tyrannical for an elite group
of intellectuals who hold disproportionate power to banish serious discussion and use of that tradition from legal discourse. Second, given
the relativist foundation of most modern American legal discourse, it is
inevitable that the tyranny that relativism in principle must produce
(see Part I) would become actual. Thus, relativism, which by its nature
cannot resolve competing claims among persons, and which in its most
common current form considers individual autonomy to be the ultimate
value, has in the very name of that autonomy already brought about
crimes against humanity.
The argument for the self-contradictory nature of modern American discourse follows from the arguments concerning tyranny. Legal
relativism claims to be more compatible with democracy and freedom
than a norm-based legal system; yet legal relativism, both in principle
and in actuality, has within its relatively short period of dominance as a
mode of legal discourse produced at least two important acts of tyranny: First, the displacement in our legal system of the mode of
thought dominant throughout our history with a mode of through dominant among a minority class of intellectuals; and second, the legalization of the killing of the unborn. A method of discourse designed to
avoid tyranny that produces egregious acts of tyranny is self-contradictory. These tyrannic acts, moreover, are logical, predictable results of
the relativist discourse, rather than mere aberrations. As such, they discredit the relativist legal enterprise.
The argument below, because it is made primarily in terms of the
inadequacies of the present relativist legal mindset, will be largely contextual and utilitarian in nature. This is, as explained above, legitimate
as a tool in demonstrating the destructive and self-contradictory nature
of reason and practice that denies the existence and governance of God.
It is not, of course, in the strict sense an argument for God; at most it
demonstrates the need for, rather than the existence of, God, who is, as
Professor Leff explained, the only really possible source of objective
values. There is, as described above, really no direct way to demonstrate the existence of God to the nonbeliever, because there is no common ground upon which to mediate between the acceptance and denial
of God. The believer must finally, in presenting the truth and goodness
of God,
always rely
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ment for God, as opposed to the argument against Godlessness, can
never be translated into terms amenable to the nonbeliever. The argument below, however, is useful not only in demonstrating the need for
God, but also in addressing to the nonbelieving legal thinker the following question: Even if you do not believe in God, or in objective norms,
are you not required, given your own contextual and utilitarian standards and your own distaste for tyranny, to engage in legal discourse
that assumes the authoritative nature of the Judeo-Christian tradition
in American legal discourse?
It may be useful before continuing to define in more specific fashion the legal relativist mindset, since such a mindset has been alleged
to be both dangerous and dominant. The relationship of that mindset to
the valuation of individual autonomy should also be evaluated. The legal relativist begins with the presupposition that objectively valid or
true norms are either nonexistent or undiscoverable, and then proceeds
to ask how, given this presupposition, a legal system should be constructed. Some legal relativists may take a similar, but seemingly absurd, position, arguing that although objectively valid or true norms do
exist and are available, such norms should not be used as the basis of
law because their use would be tyrannical in regard to those who do
not-however foolishly-embrace those true norms. In either event, the
governing principle, once objective norms are abandoned, becomes the
promotion and protection of individual autonomy. In this sense, the relativist legal mindset is distinctly not relativist, because it so frequently
posits individual autonomy as an ultimate good. Indeed, some modern
legal thinkers begin, not with the rejection of norms, but with the embracing of individual autonomy, and thus consider themselves in some
sense as within the natural law tradition. The consequence of embracing individual autonomy as the ultimate norm, however, is the rejection
of the legitimacy of other norms that do not serve individual autonomy.
Relativism and individual autonomy are thus, within the modern legal
mindset, corollaries; each is derivative from the other, so it matters little which one is put forth as the initial premise. While it would be
theoretically possible to hold to relativism without embracing the ultimate value of individual autonomy, this position at present is rare.
Formally, my definition of the relativist legal mindset includes all
those who embrace either of these presuppositions, because either effectively denies the existence of objective norms beyond the individual self.
In practice, the relativist mindset almost invariably includes both the
denial of objective norms and the ultimacy of individual autonomy.
Theologically, this is to be expected, for the ultimate position of the
natural man since the fall is said to be a rejection of God, who is the
source of objective norms and the stumbling block of man's claim to
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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individual autonomy.
To avoid a misunderstanding, it is important to add a warning: the
acknowledgment of Christianity as true and good, and of God and His
revelation as the source of objective norms, would not itself avoid the
difficult question of which true and good norms ought to be enforced
through the particular mechanism of state-enforced law. But the unaddressed question of methodology, of how to derive and address law
from the materials of the Judeo-Christian tradition, must itself be recognized as a question to be answered from the materials themselves.
Clearly, not all objectively valid norms derivable from scripture can or
should be enforced through law. But the difficult questions pertaining
to the enforcement of objective norms through law should be answered
in terms of what the Judeo-Christian tradition itself says about the use,
nature, and function of law, rather than by the imposition of some foreign methodology onto the materials. The methodology, in other words,
is itself a part of the materials.
This paper will generally not attempt to describe the methodology
found in the materials; that is work for another day. It is important,
however, to state that theistically based legal theorists who elevate the
value of individual autonomy to ultimacy have either distorted the
Judeo-Christian tradition, or else have, while claiming to be relying on
a Judeo-Christian foundation, employed an interpretive methodology
foreign to that foundation. Indeed, if the Judeo-Christian tradition
merely teaches the ultimacy for law of individual autonomy, then this
article is useless, for then the tradition in validating the current method
of legal discourse exhausts itself and becomes otherwise irrelevant.
Given my contrary view that the proper use of the Judeo-Christian tradition in legal discourse would radically alter the current state of such
discourse, the argument below acquires significance.
B. The Enlightenment and Judeo-Christian Traditions in American
History and Culture
Commentators on American history and culture have commonly
identified two traditions as predominant: The Biblical, or Judeo-Christian, and the Enlightenment, or philosophical.5 8 While space does not
permit a full account, a number of observations can be made.

58. See, e.g., H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA xi-xii (1976) (ideas of Protestant
Christianity and European Enlightenment comprise main clusters of ideas present in eighteenth
century America). Robert Bellah and his associates discern three traditions predominate in American history and culture: the Biblical, Republican, and Individualist. See R. BELLAH, supra note
39, at 27-51. The latter two, I believe, are traditions identifiably descended from either the Biblical orbyEnlightenment
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1. The Development of the Puritan Experiment: From Colonization to
Nation
Many of America's first colonists, notably the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay, came to America for the specific purpose of constructing
a society based on Christian principles."9 Governor John Winthrop's
famed sermon, "A Model of Christian Charity," composed en route to
America in 1630, placed before the Massachusetts Bay colonists the
terms of their corporate covenant with God, and their special role as a
"City upon a Hill": an example to the world of the truly constructed
Christian society."0
The acceptance by the American people of the Revolutionary
cause, more than one hundred forty years later, was predominantly a
product of the religious consciousness of the people. Their acceptance
of the Lockean principles declared in the Declaration of Independence,
including the duty to resist tyranny, the notion of government by the
consent of the governed, and the doctrine of inalienable rights, arose
specifically out of the religious events of the intervening years between
settlement and revolution. Perry Miller describes this phenomenon as
follows:
[W]e do know that well before the Civil War began in England,
Parliamentarians-and these include virtually all Puritans-had asserted
that societies are founded upon covenant; that the forms of a particular
society, even though dictated by utilitarian factors, are of divine ordination; that rulers who violate the agreed-upon forms are usurpers and so
to be legitimately resisted. This complex of doctrine was transported
bodily to early Virginia and most explicitly to Puritan New England.
The turmoils of Massachusetts Bay-the expulsion of Roger Williams
and Anne Hutchinson, the exile of Robert Child, the disciplining of the
Hingham militia, and the first trials of the Quakers-whatever other issues were involved in them, were crises in the political creed ....
The development of New England, however, steadily encouraged the
citizens to deduce that they themselves, in framing the compact, had
enumerated the items which made up the good . . . . By the mid-eighteenth century, even in "semi-Presbyterial" Connecticut, good Christians
were certain they could designate both the duties and the limitations of
magistrates. In basically similar fashion, though not so easily traceable,
the same transformation was wrought among the Protestant, or at least
among the "Calvinistic," elements of all the communities. To put the
matter bluntly, the agitation which resulted in the War for American

59.

See, e.g., I S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

187-99

(Image paperback ed. 1975); P. MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 1-15, 141-52 (1956).
60. See R. BELLAH, supra note 14, at 14-15 (quoting 2 WINTHROP PAPERS 294-95 (Mass.'
Hist. Soc. 1931)).
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Independence commenced after an immense change had imperceptibly
been wrought in the minds of the people. That they needed from 1765 to
1776 to realize this was not because they had, under stress, to acquire
the doctrine from abroad, but because they did have to search their souls
in order to discover what actually had happened within themselves.6 1
A more recent account of the development of New England Puritan political ideas can be found in Harry Stout's book, The New England Soul.6 2 Stout's work, designed as a history of the New England
sermon from 1620 to 1776, effectively describes how the New England
Puritans for one hundred fifty years maintained a continuity in their
basic religious perspective while making the political transition from
theocracy to mixed constitutionalism, and then from monarchy to republic. Stout disputes the claims of earlier scholars that colonial New
England became secularized, blaming their error on the failure to distinguish between regular (Sunday) and occasional sermons and on the
emphasis on printed occasional sermons to the virtual exclusion of regular sermon notes. 63 Occasional sermons generally were designed to address important events, such as wars, political conflicts, and natural calamities, within the religious, providential matrix of the federal
covenant.6 4 Regular Sunday preaching, however, maintained a consistent emphasis on a Calvinistic sin-salvation-service sequence, and thus
5
on the "otherworldly" concern for the state of each individual's soul.
Both regular and occasional preaching was religiously centered; occasional sermons, however, were subject to a greater degree of change as
each generation of ministers attempted to interpret the developing political situation in terms of New England's peculiar identity as a covenant people. Stout's introductory comments on the political development of New England thought in the context of this continued
spirituality emphasizes the predominance of religious over secular
themes:
The implications of enduring spirituality in the pulpit and pew are
especially important for understanding the "meaning of America" as it
unfolded in the Revolutionary era. By 1776, Congregational ministers in
New England were delivering over two thousand discourses a week and
publishing them at an unprecedented rate that outnumbered secular

61. P. MILLER, NATURE'S NATION 98 (1967).
62. H. STOUT, THE NEW ENGLAND SOUL (1986).
63. See id. at 6.
64. See, e.g., id. at 27-31.
65. See id. at 6, 32-47. Stout emphasizes the continuity of this sin-salvation-service sequence, and of basic, otherworldly, salvation preaching, throughout the five generations of colonial
Puritan sermons. See, e.g., id. at 268-71 (salvation preaching continued on Sundays in fifth generation, by
1764-1776).
Published
eCommons, 1987

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 13:3

pamphlets (from all the colonies) by a ratio of more than four to one.
Unlike most pamphlets, which were composed in private for a limited,
informed audience of the educated elite, printed sermons originated in
speech and more accurately express Revolutionary sentiments as they
were heard by the main body of New England patriots. The more one
reads these sermons the more one finds unsatisfactory the suggestion that
ideas of secular "republicanism," "civil millennialism," or class-conscious "popular ideology" were the primary ideological triggers of radical resistance and violence in the Revolution. Such temporal concerns
may have motivated other colonists, and they certainly engaged "Americans" after 1776, but they were not the ideological core around which
the Revolution in New England revolved. In Revolutionary New England, ministers continued to monopolize public communications, and the
terms they most often employed to justify resistance and to instill hope
emanated from the Scriptures and from New England's enduring identity as an embattled people of the Word who were commissioned to uphold a sacred and exclusive covenant between themselves and God. The
idea of a national covenant supplied the "liberties" New Englanders
would die protecting, as well as the "conditions" that promised deliverance and victory over all enemies. It also provided the innermost impulsion toward radical thought and violent resistance to British "tyranny" in
New England.
Covenant theology as it evolved over five generations of New World
preaching comprised a view of history and corporate identity that could
best be labeled "providential." In this view God entered into covenants
with nations, as well as with individuals, and promised that he would
uphold them by his providential might if they would acknowledge no
other sovereign and observe the terms of obedience contained in his
Word. Covenanted peoples like those of ancient Israel and New England
were the hub around which sacred (i.e., real) history revolved. Such peoples might be ignored or reviled by the world and figure insignificantly in
the great empires of profane history, but viewed through the sacred lens
of providential history they were seen as God's special instruments entrusted with the task of preparing the way for messianic deliverance. As
Israel witnessed to God's active involvement with nations in ancient
times and brought forth the Christ, so New England's experience confirmed God's continuing involvement with nations that would persist until Christ's return to earth, when history itself would cease and be swallowed up in eternity. Within this historical covenant perspective,
resistance to England was only secondarily about constitutional rights
and political liberties. Ultimately, resistance became necessary the minute England declared the colonies' duty of "unlimited submission" in "all
cases whatsoever" and, in so doing, set itself alongside God's Word as a
competing sovereign. Such demands were "tyrannical" and left New Englanders no choice but to resist unto death or forfeit their identity as a
covenant people. As explained from the pulpit, New Englanders' revoluhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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tion was first and foremost a battle to preserve their historic identity and
unique messianic destiny. 66
The modern tendency, despite the work of careful historians such
as Ahlstrom, Miller, and Stout, is to caricature the Puritans as intolerant theocrats, while portraying the classical American themes of liberties and rights as essential secular, Enlightenment concerns. It may
therefore be useful to summarize the New England Puritan journey
from theocracy to republic.
The first generation's "New England Way" can be characterized
as theocratic: God's word was considered sovereign over both church
and civil government, and civil power was employed to enforce man's
duty to God, as summarized in the first table of the Decalogue. Religious intolerance of heretics was thus considered a duty, and only
church members could vote. On the other hand, Massachusetts Bay
was governed by a bicameral system with a franchise wider than England's. The clergy, while possessed of tremendous influence through
their virtual monopoly on public communications, nonetheless had less
formal authority than that of any contemporary Western nation. The
very concept of the New England theocracy, that God rules through
His sovereign Word, implied to the Puritans that all human power
must be limited, particularly in view of the tendency of the sinful
human nature to seize power. The New England Puritans had, before
emigrating to North America, witnessed Charles I's usurpation of
power from Parliament. They were concerned from the beginning with
the problem of avoiding tyranny.6 7 The use of the term theocracy can
thus blind us to the very real liberties that the New England Way provided for its people.
The New England Way was also characterized by the wide-spread
adoption of the Cambridge Platform. Prepared by a New England ministerial synod, the Cambridge Platform addressed the then-raging English Puritan dispute between Presbyterianism and Independence and
the analogous New England dispute between Presbyterians and Congregationalists by adopting a connectional Congregationalism. The

66. Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted). For Stout's full account of the period from 1764 to 1776,
see id. at 259-311.
67. See 1 S. AHLSTROM. supra note 59, at 196-97; H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 13-31.
Ahlstrom, taking note of the representative tendencies of the original New England way, calls it
"absurd" to label it a theocracy, while Stout consistently labels it as such. This discrepancy obviously arises from contrasting uses of the term theocracy. The term does not necessarily, as Stout
uses it, imply a non-representational, authoritarian form of government. Indeed, Old Testament
Israel, which must be a theocracy if anything is to be, itself possessed representational governmental tendencies of which later Puritans took careful note. See infra notes 81-82, 84 and accompanying text.
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Cambridge Platform, while refusing to give church councils or synods
coercive power, emphasized their advisory roles, and committed
churches that adopted the Platform to the Calvinist position as expressed by the famous Westminster Assembly. 8
Finally, the founding generation of Puritans were marked by their
use of covenantial theology. This use had many faces. Puritans would
characteristically covenant with God and one another; God thus was
specially related and involved not only with the individual believer, but
also with the group. The type for these larger covenants, and especially
for God's federal covenant with New England, was found in God's
prior covenant with Israel as described in the Old Testament. New
England's capacity to maintain its religious identity over the next one
hundred fifty years was facilitated by each generation's capacity for
finding relevant parallels to contemporary events and political views in
the history of ancient Israel.69
Thus, in 1630, as the first Massachusetts Bay colonists sailed to
America, John Winthrop warned them with words taken from Moses'
admonition to the Israelites as they prepared to enter the Promised
Land.7" Massachusetts Bay's founding generation left England at a
time of great difficulties for Puritans; they came to the New World,
however, not as separatists, as had the Pilgrims of Plymouth, but as
nonconformists. They hoped that if they succeeded in their errand of
establishing a pure Christian society, Europe-and especially England-would take note and follow their example. Their hopes were subsequently fueled by events in England: the eruption of the English Civil
War, the execution of King Charles I, and establishment of the Puritan
Commonwealth. England, however, failed to learn from New England's
"City on a Hill." Cromwell and the victorious Independents adopted a
policy of limited toleration; indeed, leading Independent divines criticized New England's policy of intolerance. The middle way between
Presbyterianism and Independence represented by New England's
Cambridge Platform had little influence in England, where the contending groups became increasingly fragmented. Puritan England
proved unable to heal her divisions and establish a lasting government.
Cromwell died in 1658, and monarchy was restored in 1660. New Eng68. See I S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 204-06; H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 17-20,
50-53. American Puritans, defined to include Calvinistic Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and
Baptists, persistently adhered to versions of the Calvinistic Westminster Creeds, with alterations
made, as appropriate, on the sections concerning church polity and the role of the magistrate. See
I S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 177 n.5. Thus, Ahlstrom calls the Westminster Confession "by
far the most influential doctrinal symbol in American Protestant history." Id. at 177.
69. See, e.g., H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 7-9, 17-18.
70. See R. BELLAH. supra note 14, at 15 (citing 2 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 60, at
294-95.
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land's thriving Puritan Commonwealth thus became virtually irrelevant
to the rest of the world. The original mission of New England as a light
to the Old World, and especially to Old England, had thus to be reoriented to a concern with the continuation of the covenant from generation to generation in the New World. New England could take comfort, however, from God's promise to outcast Zion to someday heal her
wounds.7 1
Massachusetts Bay entered into a period of uncertainty when her
charter was revoked in 1684. All of New England's colonies were incorporated into an administrative system governed by the crown and its
representatives. Self-government was thus replaced by English royal
government; the new government was charged with enforcing English
law, including religious toleration. Theocracy ceased, in the sense that
English law, rather than law based solely on the authority of God's
Word, became effective in New England. Matters became worse when
the tyrannical Sir Edmund Andros was appointed royal governor of the
"Dominion of New England." Andros demanded the use of Boston's
Old South Church to institute the first Anglican services in the Bay
Colony, expropriated common lands in and around Boston for his own
use, and suppressed civil liberties through crown-appointed vice-admiralty courts. In April 1688, unconfirmed reports reached Boston of Parliament's expulsion of James II from the English throne. Given this
excuse, thousands from Boston and adjacent towns effected a revolution: they imprisoned Andros, abolished arbitrary government, and established "Committees for the Conservation of Peace" to preserve internal order. The interim government was orderly and effective; there
was no violence or civil war. In May 1689, a special convention of town
delegates voted to reestablish a representative government modeled on
the old charter; unlike the old charter, however, all landowners and
taxpayers could vote regardless of church membership.7"
New England's Glorious Revolution is an important prototype for
the Revolution for Independence. It is, moreover, significant that, in
defending their actions to England, the colonists chose to address their
audience through discourses on English rights and liberties, rather than
by reference to Congregational liberties or covenant theology. This use
of the secularized language of English law and political philosophy
would henceforth be standard in New England. It is therefore particularly important to realize that English liberties were conceived primarily in an instrumental sense as the liberty to preserve New England's
71. See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 134-36, 193-94, 205; H.
29, 50-64; P. MILLER, supra note 59, at 1-15.
72. See H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 111-16.
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special covenant with God. The colonists learned to address England in
England's own terms, as a way of obtaining the freedom they needed to
pursue their covenantial duty to God. In time, the use of the secular
English language of rights became familiar and, in a sense, internalized; it was not, however, understood in New England as representing
an end in itself, but rather only a means of securing the freedom to
pursue New England's peculiarly religious ends.7"
The linkage of English royal power and New England covenant
identity became established when Increase Mather obtained a new
royal charter in 1692. The republican interim government established
by New England's Glorious Revolution was replaced. Massachusetts,
expanded to include Plymouth and Maine, was given a crown-appointed royal governor and a popularly elected assembly that was empowered to pay the governor's salary and appoint his advisory board.
The new charter guaranteed property rights, representative government, religious toleration, and a franchise based upon property rather
than upon church membership. This government would last until 1774;
the abolition of direct theocratic self-government was thus completed.
Connecticut, however, was permitted to retain its original charter.74
New England's identity as a special covenant people survived the
abolition of the religiously coercive, theocratic state. The second and
third generations of New England Puritans found that their Congregational Churches and Reformed Christian faith were able to thrive
under the protection and freedom of the new royal charter. They concluded that the founders had been wrong to believe that the state must
coercively destroy all other Protestant groups. The Congregational polity as defined by the Cambridge Platform, while laudable and appropriate for New England's well-trained laity, was not an essential: Reformed Presbyterian Christians, and even Reformed Baptists and
Anglicans, were acknowledged as upright Christians. The role of the
state was to enforce the moral law, uphold the rights of the people
regarding life, liberty, property, and (Protestant) worship, and uphold
and support the churches. Tyranny of the sort exemplified by Andros
was to be avoided, for government under England's constitutional monarchy was still by compact, and the power of rulers was limited under
the English constitutional order. The people of Massachusetts, moreover, enjoyed the power to elect the Governor's Council through their
representatives; taxation without representation therefore would not
75
occur.

73. See id. at 116-17, 121.
74. See id. at 117-18.
75. See id. at 118-22, 128-31, 166-72.
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The second and third generation of New England Puritans believed that the exact form of church and civil government could properly vary; scripture established only certain broad patterns or principles. They continued, however, to believe that New England constituted
a peculiar people in covenant relationship with God, and thus continued
to look to the scriptures, and especially to Old Testament Israel, for
their example. They found that the principles of constitutional monarchy had been established in Saul's and David's reigns over Israel, for
those kings were presented for acceptance by the people before being
anointed. Similarly, the present pattern of governor assisted by a representative council was analogized to the rule of Moses and Aaron assisted by a council of seventy elders selected from a larger group of
elders who represented the various tribes. God, thus, ruled through
godly leaders, rather than directly through His own voice. God's government of His people came to be identified with the principles that
government should be contractual, limited, republican, and representative. So long as civil government performed its proper duties within its
limited sphere, the work of the churches, upon which the continuation
of the federal covenant depended, could continue.76
The work of the churches did continue, and bore fruit during the
fourth generation in a spiritual revival known as the Great Awakening.
The Great Awakening is generally considered to begin or be prefigured
in 1734, and to reach intercolonial significance in the early 1740s. The
Great Awakening was a revival of Reformed, Calvinistic Christianity:
the two most important figures, Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield, both preached a thoroughgoing, experiential Calvinism."
The relationship of the Great Awakening to the American Revolution has been a matter of some controversy. In some respects, this controversy reflects the larger conflict concerning the respective importance of the Christian and Enlightenment motivations for the War for
Independence. Within the present framework of explaining the historical development within colonial Christian America of republican, democratic ideals, several observations may be made.
First, the Great Awakening enhanced the authority, repute, and
self-respect of the laity. Congregational polity, and to some extent
nearly all Protestant church polity, tends to emphasize in varying degrees the authority and importance of the laity. In the context of New
England Congregationalism, however, this tendency had been largely

76.
77.

See id. at 128-29, 166-74.
See, e.g., I S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 327-28, 346-402; A. HEIMERT, RELIGION

AND THE AMERICAN MIND, FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO THE REVOLUTION 1-236 (1966); H.

STOUT, supra note 62, at 185-211. See generally I. MURRAY, JONATHAN EDWARDS (1987).
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latent. Ministers had persuasively established overwhelming authority
through complete control of the most important medium, the sermon;
through an emphasis on the University training and special mission of
the ministry; and through the tradition of the jeremiad, whereby the
ministers laid the responsibility for God's temporal punishments of
New England upon the stiff-necked laity, who like ancient Israel ignored the many warnings of the prophets (ministers). In the Great
Awakening, however, the people were given their own voice: lay people,
even women, were encouraged to share their "testimonies"; untrained
local men followed the example of the itinerant evangelist Whitefield
and began to tour the land with their gospel message. Leaders of the
movement, moreover, charged that the grievous spiritual condition of
New England was primarily the fault not of the laity, but of the existence of large numbers of unconverted ministers. The ministers were
generally divided into two groups: The "Old Lights," who opposed the
Great Awakening, and the "New Lights," who supported it. Some New
Light representatives, moreover, became so extreme that even leaders
such as Jonathan Edwards were highly embarrassed by their excesses.
The net affect of the criticisms of, and split among, the ministers, was
to further elevate the laity at the expense of the embattled ministers.78
Although the split in the ministry was healed relatively quickly (in
part because of the need to unite for the war effort against France), the
Great Awakening did leave a lasting legacy in the form of greater regard for the piety and authority of the laity. The elevation of the laity
vis-a-vis the ministry arguably contributed to an atmosphere of greater
assertiveness by the people toward their government. Having been told
that they must defend the true Christian church upon occasion from
particular ministers, the laity were no doubt most willing and zealous
to defend their federal covenant with God when it was imperiled by
English royal tyranny.7 9
Second, the Great Awakening was conducive to a consciousness of
American unity. The Great Awakening was not just a New England
event; Whitefield and others preached in the middle and southern colonies as well as in New England. Thus, the entire, diverse nation-to-be
was touched (to varying degrees) by the same message of revivalistic
Reformed Christianity.8" The intercolonial significance of the Great

78. See H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 185-218.
79. See id. at 211-38, 273-75, 285-87; A. HEIMERT, supra note 77, at vii-viii, 18-19. Alan
Heimert concluded that, while those of a liberal (anti-Calvinist and/or anti-Awakening) religious
view were generally politically and socially conservative, and only reluctantly became rebels, "Calvinism, and Edwards, provided pre-Revolutionary America with a radical, even democratic, social
and political ideology ....
" A. HEIMERT, supra note 77, at vii-viii.
80. See I S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 350; A. HEIMERT, supra note 77, at vii-viii,
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Awakening is best seen in light of the Revolutionary rhetoric, which a
generation later would in effect add the other nine colonies to God's
covenant with New England.8 1 Americans were thus identified, at the
very outset of our history as a separate nation, as a covenant people.82
The Independence cause was thus presented to the people, by both
their governmental bodies and their churches, through the matrix of
the federal covenant. Thus, the Continental Congress, the various colonial bodies, and the clergy persistently called for days of public humiliation, fasting, and prayer, stating that God would award them victory
over the British if the people would only repent and purify their ways.
Thus, in the defeat of Britain, one could see New England's traditional
formula of repentance before God combined with the active effort that
confidence in God's providence inspired.8 3
The Revolutionary rhetoric joined the themes of national sin and
repentance with those of liberty and of Lockean duties and rights, and
thus followed the tradition of speaking a double language of apparently
secular liberties and covenant responsibilities. The secular language
had changed: the English system of constitutional monarchy had
proved inadequate to prevent tyranny and it was replaced with a variety of more radical ideologies. The focus of the federal covenant also
changed. While the first two generations had focused on direct divine
rule, and the third and fourth on constitutional monarchy under the
Davidic dynasty, the Revolutionary generation concluded that Israel
had been best governed by Judges, and had been brought to spiritual
and political disarray by their demand that God give them a king.
Thus, Israel's original form of government had been a "perfect repub-

12-14 (Awakening and Calvinism promoted American unity); H. STOUT, supra note 62, at
189-90.
81. See P. MILLER. supra note 61, at 92; H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 295-96, 301-02; A.
HEIMERT, supra note 77, at 14.
82. Stout warns against "reading America as New England writ large," but also warns
against "understat[ing] the importance of New England's religious culture to the evolving American Republic and, more particularly, the influence of Puritan rhetoric on the American identity."
H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 9. Space does not permit me, in this context, the luxury of detailing
the significance of the religious development of the other regions. It seems most appropriate to
center on New England because the Puritan experiment, which was also carried on to some degree
in other regions, was most concentrated there, and because the Puritan vision was in some sense
adopted by the nation during the struggle for independence. Indeed, the Reformed doctrine of a
federal covenant was well known in many of the other colonies. See P. MILLER, supra note 61, at
92. In addition, New England dominated intercolonial communications during the Revolutionary
period; thus, while the New England view was everywhere heard, contrasting interpretations remained localized. See id.; H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 284. Finally, the Great Awakening was, as
noted above, an intercolonial event. All of this suggests that the most important story to be told is
that of Puritan New England, and the manner in which its vision of America was adopted and
transformed.
83. See P. MILLER, supra note 61, at 90-108; H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 259-311.
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lic," urged President Langdon of Harvard College in May 1775. New
England had successfully governed itself for two generations before
coming under the spiritually and politically corrosive rule of the English crown. Moreover, Connecticut, which had been allowed to retain
its original charter, and thus had practiced self-government for five
generations, had proven that self-government need not lead to anarchy.
Even Thomas Paine's tremendously popular pamphlet, Common
Sense,8 recounted at length the story of Israel's "national delusion" in
requesting a King, and thus argued that the Old Testament demonstrated God's displeasure with monarchical government. To a Protestant audience inclined to identify Roman Catholicism with the antiChrist, Paine declared that "monarchy in every instance is the popery
of government." 85 Paine, a deist who after the Revolution freely advertised his heretical views, managed to sound in some respects like a Congregational clergyman. 8" Indeed, Calvinist publications (quoting a 1773
election sermon) frequently condemned the view that public servants
were not responsible to the public as "popery, either in religion or
politics." 8 7
Miller's and Stout's work therefore demonstrates that Lockean
ideas, as well as other apparently secular political concepts, were accepted and utilized because they coincided with the experience of the
religiously motivated colonists in constructing and maintaining a Christian polity. The ease with which Puritan colonists could place such concepts within their Biblically based federal covenant should not be surprising. Modern scholarship, for example, indicates that Locke's
political ideas were themselves derivative from theological and political
concepts that had begun their development with the canonists of the
twelfth century.8 8 Locke's partially secularized political ideas and those
of the colonists find their common root in Christian Europe's centurieslong struggle to order and define religious and secular authority.
From the vantage point of the colonists, apparently secular political concepts could be related to a much more ancient and eminent authority than the history of Christian Europe: that of the scriptures
themselves. From a broad historical viewpoint, the colonists' perspective is justifiable: the American Revolution was the staging in the New
World of the religious and political implications of the European Reformation, which emphasized as a movement the authority of scripture.

84. T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in T. PAINE, WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE I
(D. Wheeler ed. 1915) [hereinafter T. PAINE, WRITINGS].
85. T. PAINE, WRITINGS, supra note 84, at 19.
86. See H. STOUT, supra note 62, at 9, 259-311; P. MILLER, supra note 61, at 90-108.
87. A. HEIMERT, supra note 77, at 513.
88. See infra note 145.
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One therefore cannot coherently discuss the Reformation, and colonial
America, without reference to scripture, and the interpretation of scrip-

ture. In that context, it is easy to be cynical about the colonists' capacity to first embrace, then revile, monarchy. The colonists' perspective
suggests another interpretation: God was teaching them, through
events, and in His providence, to better understand the meaning of His
desire that Israel not be like the other nations. The republican, and
even the anti-monarchical, implications of scripture are, after all, by no
means insubstantial. a9
In assessing the meaning of America, then, it is important to un-

derstand that America was at its outset a Protestant or Reformed
Christian nation, rather than an Enlightenment nation; one has to journey to France to find an example of a contemporary revolution truly

89. The claim that the scriptures teach republican, anti-monarchical principles is too complex to be analyzed satisfactorily in the context of this article. The claim may appear implausible:
Israel was ruled by monarchy for much of its history; the scriptures generally admonish obedience
to political authority, including kings, see I Peter 2:13-:17; Romans 13:1-:7; and government by
monarchy has been a commonplace for much of the history of the world. It may be helpful as a
starting place for assessing this claim to quote at length from I Samuel 8, one of the key passages
relied on by the anti-monarchical colonists. In analyzing this passage, one should be aware that it
was considered virtually idolatrous, and certainly disobedient, for ancient Israel to be like the
other nations. Indeed, God's command that Old Testament Israel not be like the other nations is a
recurrent, dominant Old Testament theme. See, e.g.. Leviticus 18:24-:30.
I Samuel 8 (New Int'l Version) states:
So all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at Ramah. They said
to him, "You are old, and your sons do not walk in your ways; now appoint a king to lead
us, such as all the other nations have."
But when they said, "Give us a king to lead us," this displeased Samuel; so he prayed
to the Lord. And the Lord told him: "Listen to all that the people are saying to you; it is
not you they have rejected as their king, but me. As they have done from the day I brought
them up out of Egypt until this day, forsaking me and serving other gods, so they are doing
to you. Now listen to them; but warn them solemnly and let them know what the king who
will reign over them will do."
Samuel told all the words of the Lord to the people who were asking him for a king.
He said, "This is what the king who will reign over you will do: He will take your sons and
make them serve with his chariots and horses, and they will run in front of his chariots.
Some he will assign to be commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and others
to plow his ground and reap his harvest, and still others to make weapons of war and
equipment for his chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and
bakers. He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive groves, and give them to
his attendants. He will take a tenth of your grain and of your vintage and give it to his
officials and attendants. Your menservants and maidservants and the best of your cattle
and donkeys he will take for his own use. He will take a tenth of your flocks, and you
yourselves will become his slaves. When that day comes, you will cry out for relief from the
king you have chosen, and the Lord will not answer you in that day.
But the people refused to listen to Samuel. "No!" they said. "We want a king over us.
Then we will be like all the other nations, with a king to lead us and to go out before us
and fight our battles."
When Samuel heard all that the people said, he repeated it before the Lord. The Lord
answered, "Listen to them and give them a king."
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dominated by the ideas of the philosophers. This is not to say that
many of America's political leaders were not, in a broad sense, Deists.
The people, however, were not motivated to fight by Deism, or rationalism; the people fought the Revolution for Protestant Christianity.9" Rationalist political leaders therefore were inclined to use a kind of double
language, referring to secular ideologies which could be supported either through the federal covenant or through rationalism, and referring
to God without distinguishing carefully between a theistic or deistic
God.
Thus, the Declaration of Independence, while clearly awash in
Lockean concepts, found the people's entitlement to political independence based not only on nature but on "Nature's God." God was
credited with the authorship of man's "unalienable rights" as part and
parcel of his authorship of man. While this terminology can refer either
to the deism of its author, Thomas Jefferson, or to the theism of Protestant Christianity, the final paragraph of the Declaration appeals "to
the Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions,"
while similarly claiming "a firm reliance on the protection of divine
Providence." 91 Divine providence and judgment are characteristically
theistic themes.92 Jefferson therefore was able to write in a way that
largely satisfied both himself and his audience. Nevertheless, he found
it prudent while President to refrain from publishing his compilation
The Philosophy of Jesus9 3 because its revelation of his heretical views
would have been politically damaging. 4
2. The Nineteenth Century: The Trial and Restatement of the National Covenant in the Evangelical Era
While the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the time of
the great Puritan experiment, the nineteenth century was the era of
Evangelical America. The Puritan federal covenant became transformed into the millennial vision of Christian America. During this
great era of optimistic evangelical faith, America's covenant with God
was tested by the great Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln's restatement of the meaning of America in the midst of this great trial
became a nationally normative interpretation of the transformed fed90. See, e.g., P. MILLER, supra note 61, at 103-04.
91. The Declaration of Independence, supra note 34, para. 32.
92. See, e.g., J. CALVIN, supra note 57, at 48 (those who deny God's providence and judgment shut him up idle in heaven and in effect deny his existence).
93. T. JEFFERSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JESUS (1804), reprinted in JEFFERSON'S EXTRACTS
FROM THE GOSPELS 55 (D. Adams 1983) [hereinafter EXTRACTS].
94. See R. KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 342-43 (paperback ed. 1978). Kirk,
like some others, calls Jefferson's first compilation, The Philosophg of Jesus, by the name of the
second compilation, The Life and Morals of Jesus. See EXTRACTS, supra note 93, at 3.
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eral covenant.
The mood among Christian leaders as the eighteenth century came
to a close was one of increasing alarm. It had not taken long for the
euphoria of victory to be replaced by the somber realization that independence had not obviated the need for spiritual repentance. The violence of the French Revolution was certainly a sober reminder that Enlightenment ideas in themselves cannot contain the dark passions of
humans; the specter of humans sinking into unwashed depravity as the
great West was settled by the white race was a further anxiety. The
stage was thus set for renewed calls for Christian repentance and conversion and for the dramatic and important second Great Awakening.9"
The second Great Awakening, and the consequent nineteenth-century phenomenon of revivalistic, competitive, Protestant sectarianism,
represent a gradual but definite modification of the spirit of the colonial-era first Great Awakening. Initially, the second Great Awakening
was largely carried out under the auspices of ministers who were spiritual descendants of Jonathan Edward's intellectually vital and highly
orthodox Calvinism. As the century went on, however, other approaches, often hostile to the strict Calvinist tradition, predominated.
New England's tightly controlled Puritan establishments had been
dominated by creeds such as the Westminster Confession and by a
highly trained, learned ministry; a more mobile, more diverse population engaged in settling the West created a very differentcontext of
religious voluntarism and competition. Baptists and Methodists
predominated, new sects formed and reformed, and the rigors of New
England theology gave way to Armenian Wesleyanism, and to various
simplified, highly emotional presentations of the gospel. Jonathan Edwards had labored against the rationalistic tendencies of his age on two
fronts: he had sought to infuse Puritan New England with the spirit of
revivalism and had restated the historic Puritan commitment to the
Calvinist views of free will, original sin, human depravity, and irresistible grace. Edwards was thus anti-rationalistic in that he, in all things,
depended ultimately on God's Spirit rather than on human reason,
consent, or will: it was God's Spirit who brought revival, and engaged
the human affections, and it was God's Spirit, working in the human
heart, who could (according to traditional Calvinist doctrine) bring the
depraved human heart to a saving faith. In the nineteenth century,
however, a highly emotional revivalism joined forces with rationalistic
doctrines that declared every person to have the power, apart from
God's special grace, to accept salvation. Conversion became not so

95.

See. e.g., G.

MARSDEN, THE EVANGELICAL MIND AND THE NEW SCHOOL PRESBYTEP. MILLER, supra note 61, at 87-89, 105-20.

RIAN EXPERIENCE 7-10 (1970);
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much a matter of the Holy Spirit converting the human heart, but of
the persuasive powers of the preacher joining with the free will of his
audience."
One can argue which doctrine-that of Edwards and Calvin or
that of Wesley and Finney-had a greater democratic import. Edward's Calvinist revivalism emphasized that God's Spirit could visit anyone, regardless of class or level of education, and thus appeared more
democratic than that of his contemporary opponents, who tended to
embrace the spiritually hierarchical notion that the laity should silently
and obediently follow their highly educated, and thus more spiritual,
clergy.9" The Wesleyan and Armenian revivalists of the nineteenth century, however, were certainly men of the people; they presented the
gospel in forceful, easily understandable terms, and essentially told
each person that it was up to him, rather than up to God, whether he
would be eternally blessed or damned. Under the Wesleyan and Armenian revivalists, then, God "became" a democrat, for He allowed each
individual a more or less equal chance to accept His offer of salvation.
Presbyterians and Congregationalists remained numerically and
culturally very significant, and many Baptists remained largely Calvinist in their theological orientation. Calvinism-and particularly strict
Calvinism-became, however, just one component of a broader vision
of a Christian America. Christian America came to mean evangelical
Protestant America: the term subsumed a spectrum of competing theologies whose proponents often managed, despite their fierce competitiveness, to find common ground in their confession of the Bible and in
what one author described as "the great doctrines which are universally
conceded by Protestants to be fundamental and necessary to salvation
• . .the sum of which is 'repentance towards God,' and 'faith towards
our Lord Jesus Christ . ...' "98 The Evangelicals as a group were intensely active and reform-minded; they believed that Christianity could
make individuals, and the nation, better and better. Evangelicalism became identified with a kind of millennial nationalism, as the evangelicals labored to bring about their dream of America as the apex of
Christian civilization.9 9
The abolitionist struggle, and the Civil War itself, occurred in the

See, e.g., I S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 468-592; G. MARSDEN. supra note 95; I.
supra note 77, at 445-66 (1987); THE AMERICAN EVANGELICALS, 1800-1900 (W. McLoughlin ed. 1968) (hereinafter THE AMERICAN EVANGELICALS].
96.

MURRAY,

97.

See H.

98.

R.

STOUT,

supra note 62, at 202-07.

BAIRD, RELIGION IN AMERICA
EVANGELICALS, supra note 96, at 29, 32, 37.

(1844), reprinted in part in

THE

AMERICAN

99. See, e.g., I S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 468-592; G. MARSDEN. supra note 95; R.
HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA (1971); THE AMERICAN EVANGELICALS, supra note 96.
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midst of the great Evangelical century, and thus must be viewed in that
context.1 0 The religious interpretation of the Civil War rose to nationally normative prominence in the words of Abraham Lincoln, often
called America's greatest public theologian. Lincoln's famed words ring
down to us precisely because he was able, at a time of national crisis, to
resound and rejoin the themes of God's providence and religiously
based Lockean freedoms.
Lincoln's religious premise, brought before the nation in his Second Inaugural Address and etched in granite at his memorial in Washington, posited that the Civil War was God's punishment of the entire
nation-North and South-for the sin of slavery. The nation was still
under covenant as a nation with God, who in His providence was judging it. Lincoln's Lockean premise was most beautifully phrased in the
Gettysburg Address, memorized by generations of American schoolchildren, which asked whether a nation "dedicated to the proposition
that all men are created equal . . . can long endure."' 0 1 Lincoln's
Lockean premise was, moreover, solidly grounded in his religious premise: humans are "created equal" and "endowed with inalienable
rights" specifically because God created them in His image. 0 2
Lincoln has been called "the spiritual center of American history."10 3 The Revolutionary rhetoric had joined the notion of the colonists' covenant with God to that of a religiously based Lockean view of
human rights and the polity. Lincoln is central because he, as
America's leader in its greatest crisis, stated in word and deed that the
Revolutionary rhetoric was not mere empty, self-serving verbiage, but
rather was part of a pact with God, enforced by that almighty Governor and Judge. As a part of His plan to progressively realize the high
ideals of the covenant, God was punishing his people for their continuing breach of the Lockean principles of that covenant. Lincoln is central because he pointed both backwards to the founding of the covenant, however marred by the compromise concerning slavery, and
forward to the "new birth of freedom" and continuing progressive realization of our covenant ideals that would, with God's help, occur in the
04
future.1

100. See, e.g., 2 S. AHLSTROM, supra note 59, at 75-139 (discussing relationship of evangelical revivalism to humanitarian reformism; describing the responses of the churches, and Christian
leaders, to slavery and the civil war).
101. A. LINCOLN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (R. Basler ed.
1946) (1971 reprint).
102. See W. WOLF, LINCOLN'S RELIGION 96-97 (1970); 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 17-23 (R. Basler ed. 1953); 8 id. at 332-33.
103. W. WOLF, supra note 102, at 153 (quoting Mead, Abraham Lincoln's 'Last Best Hope
of Earth': The American Dream of Destiny and Democracy. CHURCH HIST., Mar. 1954, at 3).
See, e.g.. id. at1987
98 (describing Lincoln's view of the progressive realization of freedom).
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Lincoln restated, and transformed, the Puritan and Evangelical
theme of America as a redeemer nation, chosen by God to fulfill a
special role in history. Lincoln identified America's sacred mission with
the progressive realization of the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence, in particular the principles of equality and inalienable rights. Thus, in the Gettysburg Address, his primary concern
was that the principles of liberty and equality embodied by the nation
"shall not perish from the earth. 10 5 His December 1, 1862, message to
Congress called the Union the "last best hope of earth.""', In February
1861, Lincoln noted that the struggle for national independence had
held out a great promise to all the people of the world to all time to
come . . . . I shall be most happy indeed if I shall be an humble instru-

Wolf's entire work is very helpful in analyzing the critical continuities between Lincoln's personal
religious beliefs, and his historically-important political actions and statements. Wolf's work is
also a very helpful analysis of Lincoln's public theology, which has been of such importance historically, and which can only be briefly described herein.
As Lincoln's personal religion has been a consistently controversial topic, both during Lincoln's life, and since, a brief summary of Wolf's conclusions may be appropriate.
Lincoln was raised in the context of revivalistic, highly sectarian and divisive, frontier religion. Much of his boyhood religious training occurred among Baptists who were probably Calvinist in orientation; they believed that God foreordained all events by divine decree. During his early
manhood Lincoln became relatively rationalistic, and passed through a period of inner turmoil and
doubt regarding his religious beliefs. He exhibited at the same time a pronounced tendency toward
fatalism; he very likely attempted to state in secular philosophical language a version of the predestinarian doctrines he had learned as a child. Lincoln never joined a church, but he frequently
attended, and came under the influence of several Old School Presbyterian ministers. He largely
resolved his intellectual doubts prior to becoming President, and thus became intellectually convinced of the truth of the Christian religion. Lincoln remained, however, hostile to creedal formulations of the faith; his faith was centered on the scriptures, rather than on a church. His biblically-centered faith, moreover, was never completely orthodox; in particular, he maintained a
belief (which he sought to prove by scripture) of universal salvation. This explains his refusal to
join a church; he could not in good conscience have passed the creedal requirements of most
contemporary churches, including in particular the churches he attended. His view of providence,
that is, of God's governance of events, and of nations, was, however, apparently a spirituallydeepened version of the Calvinism he had been taught as a youth. Personal and national tragedy
drove him, particularly during his presidential years, into a profound dependence on, and search
for, the will of God. He became a man of prayer who, understanding God as the ruler of nations,
strove as leader of a nation to be a humble instrument of God's will.
This interpretation of Lincoln's religious development appears more accurate than the charge
that Lincoln was a nonbeliever who spoke to the people in religious terms merely as a means of
motivating them. Nonetheless, even if the latter view is substantially correct, Lincoln's speeches
can still be considered to represent the continuation of the covenantial view of American history;
their plain meaning, which was, and continues to be, understandable to the American people, are
surely of more significance than the hidden beliefs or motivations of Lincoln himself. Lincoln's
speeches-in particular the Second Inaugural Address-belong to the people, for whom they were
intended. Once the people have embraced them, it matters little whether they were spoken cynically or sincerely.
105. 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 102, at 21.
106. A. LINCOLN, supra note 101, at 688.
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ment in the hands of the Almighty, and of this, his almost chosen people,
for perpetuating the object of that great struggle.10 7
The ambiguity of that famous phrase, "almost chosen people," might
be said to evoke the conditional nature of the Puritan federal covenant,
under which the colonists would continue as God's chosen people only
if they remained faithful and obedient. However interpreted, this
phrase, as well as Lincoln's many other statements, constitute central,
well-known, and beloved statements of the meaning of America in the
context of America's divinely appointed mission to the world.
3. The Secularization Thesis and the Twentieth Century
Lincoln confidently informed the American people that "it is the
duty of nations as well as of men, to own their dependence upon the
overruling power of God . . -.
"I The words "under God," which are
a part of our Pledge of Allegiance, are traceable to his spontaneous
addition while delivering the Gettysburg Address; the motto, "In God
We Trust," which appears on our coinage and is engraved on the walls
of both houses of Congress, was first used in his administration;
Thanksgiving was first established as a national holiday during his
Presidency. 0 9 Yet the avalanche of material on our culture's secularization and pluralism could easily lead one to believe that Lincoln's religious premises are a part of American tradition the way that the flat
earth theory is a part of Western tradition. Under such an analysis, the
Judeo-Christian tradition would be useless to us in discerning the
proper direction of the march of freedom. We have, the argument goes,
cleansed that tradition of any particularistic moral or theistic notions
that would have aided us, leaving only the indeterminate conceptualisms, such as freedom and equality.
One response to this theory is to note that one of the most successful" reform movements of this century, the civil rights movement, was
sustained by the Lincolnian premise, including, most emphatically, Lincoln's religious premises. The rhetoric and thought of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. were awash in Christian premises and imagery, as well
107. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 102, at 236.
108. W. WOLF, supra note 101, at 162.
109. See E. TRUEBLOOD, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THEOLOGIAN OF AMERICAN ANGUISH 6-7
(1973).
110. The civil rights movement was successful in replacing generations of de jure racial
segregation with the principle of equal treatment before the law, and even affirmative action. The
changes achieved in social practice were profound, and have apparently achieved normative status
even in those parts of the country where the greatest resistance was encountered. On the other
hand, the movement was unsuccessful in addressing economic issues, or in preventing a situation
where a disproportionate percentage of black Americans are a part of a socially immobile
underclass.
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as in the specific imagery of the Civil War. To Dr. King and many of
his followers, the words of the Battle Hymn of the Republic were just
as applicable as when they were written some hundred years before.
A response to the secularization thesis, however, requires at least a
brief treatment of both twentieth-century American religious history
and modern sociological reports. Protestantism, in its Reformed, Puritan, and Evangelical forms, was culturally dominant in America from
colonization through the greater part of the nineteenth century. The
critical confrontation between Evangelical Protestantism and modernism can be approximately placed in the period from 1870 to 1930. The
clash produced the Fundamentalist-Modernist split within American
Protestantism."' The Fundamentalists were clearly defeated in the
sense that liberal Protestantism became "mainline" Protestantism: the
primary representative of the faith, both among elites and apparently
among the mass of laity as well. The proper interpretation of this split
clearly depends on perspective: in one writer's view, this period is labeled one of religious awakening;112 from another perspective, the triumph of accommodationist Protestantism is a defeat for historic orthodoxy and a sell-out to secularizers.11 3 From either perspective, however,
a fundamental shift has occurred.
Some argue that the mainline churches were successful, until
about 1960, in carrying forward the vision of Christian America as a
people in special covenant with God and an example before the world
of Christian civilization. Events were, after all, cooperative: we
emerged through the World Wars as the world's most powerful defender of Democracy, having defeated the Fascists and generously as4
sisted in the rebuilding of Europe and Japan." The civil rights movement was a product of the black churches, with some support from
liberal Protestants, Jews, and Catholics; white conservative Protestantism, on the whole, was either silent or critical. Confidence in the ruling
5
trinity of America, Democratic Civilization, and Christianity" was
high, and the mainline churches were their primary representatives in

Ill. See, e.g., G.

MARSDEN,

HUNTER, AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM

112.

FUNDAMENTALISM

AND

AMERICAN

CULTURE

(1980);

J.

27-34 (1983).

See R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 215-16 (1984) (citing W. McLOUGH-

LIN, REVIVALS, AWAKENINGS, AND REFORM 152, 156, 157 (1978)).

113. See, e.g., id. at 215-16.
114. Cf id. at 208-09 (quoting W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 112, at 106); M. MARTY,
RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE 255-60 (1970). Some commentators state that by the 1950s, American Catholicism and American Judaism had become mainline: to be American was to be either Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. See, e.g., W. ROOF & W. McKINNEY, AMERICAN MAINLINE RELIGION
14 (1987) (quoting W. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW 56 (1960)).
115. Robert Handy analyzes the earlier development of this "trinity" in depth in R. HANDY,
supra note 99. A concise discussion can be found in R. NEUHAUS, supra note 112, at 208-12.
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the religious community.
Whatever the success of mainline Protestantism earlier in this century, recent decades have seen its apparent demise, religiously and culturally, as the bearer of the American vision. This decline has a number of elements. Mainline Protestant churches have suffered from
declining membership while conservative Protestant churches have
grown."' Moreover, becoming increasingly alienated from the laity, the
institutional leadership of mainline Protestant churches apparently
have placed virtually their entire moral capital behind the secular
agenda of left-wing political groups, while paying little attention to the
specifically religious beliefs and needs of their memberships. The mainline churches have become followers of secular causes whose leaders
believe religion to be irrelevant. " 7 In the meantime, conservative Protestantism has reorganized and reasserted itself as the current Evangelical movement."18 Similarly, Roman Catholicism has, over time, come
to numerical and cultural prominence in what was once a Protestant
America. Evangelical Protestantism and Roman Catholicism have thus
emerged as the primary bearers of America's religious life." 9
Whatever the changes in American religious life, it is clear that
Americans as a whole remain highly theistic in their beliefs. George
Gallup, for example, reports the following in his 1985 Report on religion in America: Sixty-six percent believe in a personal God who
watches over and judges people, seventy-one percent believe in life after
death, seventy-one percent believe in heaven and fifty-three percent believe in hell, seventy-five percent believe that Jesus is God, fifty-six percent say religion is very important in their life, sixty-eight percent
claim membership in a church or synagogue, forty percent attend
church in a typical week, and forty percent claim a Christian born-

116. See GALLUP REPORT No. 236, supra note 52, at 11, 27; W. ROOF & W. MCKINNEY,
supra note 114, at 85-94, 231, 233-34.
117. See R. NEUHAUS, supra note 112, at 231-47.
118. See J. HUNTER, supra note Ill, at 41-48. The current Evangelical movement has
largely incorporated both the evangelical and fundamentalist groups within conservative American
Protestantism. See id.; cf H. Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY 44-47 (1984) (describing
differences and similarities between fundamentalism and evangelicalism).
119. See GALLUP REPORT No. 236, supra note 52, at 11-12, 27-28 (1985); W. ROOF & W.
MCKINNEY, supra note 114, at 148-85, 229-44; cf H. Cox, supra note 118 (examining antimodernist movements and theologies, including fundamentalism, liberation theology, base communities, and traditional Catholicism as sources for emerging post-modern theology; declaring that
the great era of modern theology is drawing to a close).
Judaism, a part of the Protestant-Catholic-Jewish mainline of the 1950s, see supra note 114,
yet "always a minority religious tradition in the United States," faces "severe demographic challenges," although it appears likely to retain "considerable social and religious significance." See
W. ROOF & W. McKINNEY, supra note 114, at 232.
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again experience."'
If the American people are still vibrantly theistic, then why does
Lincoln's notion of America in covenant with the Living Ruler of all
creation seem to many quaint or illegitimate-hardly the awesome
message of real-world Judgment displayed, for example, in Lincoln's
Second Inaugural Address? Such a question may require a complex
answer. Perhaps the simplest component, however, is that there is a
cultural gap in America between the academy, including the law
school, and the people. 2 ' Paul in the first letter to the church at Corinth noted that "not many of you were wise by human standards."' 2 2
While the church has never been without its intellectually gifted apologists and theologians, it appears evident that a disproportionate percentage of our culture's intellectual elite-particularly in the areas of
higher education and mass communications-are hostile or indifferent
to traditional theism.' 2 3 Thus, it remains to those most directly dependent on the people for their livelihood-politicians-to regularly invoke
religious themes, whether sincerely or cynically. 24

120. GALLUP REPORT No. 236, supra note 52, at 22-23, 38, 40-41, 42-43, 50, 51-52,
53-54. For an account of sociological research centered on religious belief and practice in one
locality over a long period of time, see T. CAPLOW, H. BAHR, B. CHADWICK, D. HOOVER, L.
MARTIN, J. TAMNEY & M. WILLIAMSON, ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN
MIDDLETOWN'S RELIGION (1983). For documentation of the impact of religious belief on values,
see THE CONNECTICUT
OF BELIEF (1981)

MUTUAL LIFE REPORT ON AMERICAN VALUES IN THE '80s: THE IMPACT

[hereinafter CONNECTICUT REPORT].

See White, supra note 1. Professor White writes:
In the academic world we tend to speak as though all participants in our conversations
were purely rational actors engaged in rational debate; perhaps some people out there in
the world are sufficiently benighted that they turn to religious beliefs or other superstitions,
but that is not true of us or, if it is true, we hide it, and it ought not be true of them ....
Yet . . . [olurs is an extremely, sometimes fervently religious nation, at least in its protestations and in some of its behavior as well, and one wonders about an academic world that
seems to be blind to this fact.
121.

id.
122. 1 Corinthians 1:26. Paul was one of the early exceptions; indeed, Peter noted that some
of Paul's writings are "hard to understand." 2 Peter 3:16.
123. See Bell, The New Class: A Muddled Concept, in THE NEW CLASS? 169, 186-87 (B.
Bruce-Briggs ed. 1979); Berger, The Worldview of the New Class: Secularity and Its Discontents.
in THE NEW CLASS?, supra, at 49; Lipset, The New Class and the Professoriate in THE NEW
CLASS?, supra, at 67, 74, 81-82 (citing J. LEUBA, THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY 219-87
(1921) (academics as a group more likely than non-academics to disdain religion, and academic
eminence associated with religious disbelief within the professoriate)); see also CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 120, at 210-17; E. LADD, JR. & S. LIPSET, THE DIVIDED ACADEMY: PROFESSORS
AND POLITICS 135-36, 162-67 (1975); J. LEUBA, THE REFORMATION OF THE CHURCHES 17-49
(1950); Lichter & Rothman, Media and Business Elites, PUB. OPINION, Oct.-Nov. 1981, at 42,
43.
124. See, e.g., President's Address to the Nation: Soviet Union-United States Summit in
Washington, D.C., 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 1502 (Dec. 10, 1987). This speech of President
Ronald W. Reagan stands firmly in the Lincolnian tradition of joining the themes of the march of
freedom, divine guidance, and America's special role of sharing its traditions with the world.
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Sociologists and other commentators have elaborated and debated
the bias of modern intellectual elites against traditional theism as part
of a discussion of the so-called "New Class." The New Class, while
defined in a number of ways, certainly includes those in the universities
and in mass media who earn their income through the processing, creation and propagation of information and cultural symbols. 12 5 The New
Class becomes increasingly prominent because information, knowledge,
and symbols are increasingly important products of our postindustrial
society, and the New Class controls the means of their production. 26
The New Class speaks a common language of critical discourse whose
underlying cause is the autonomy of the mind;12 7 hence, the New Class
as a group tends toward a natural aversion to traditional theism, which
subjugates the mind's autonomy to the authority of God's revelation.
Among university intellectuals, the autonomy of modern critical discourse and of the individual mind is sometimes considered to date from
the overthrow of theism's moral and intellectual authority; the death of
God becomes the birth and starting point for this group's common discourse."' Hence, although the difficulty or even impossibility of filling
the void left by the death of God, or the overthrow of the Judeo-Christian tradition, is a major theme of intellectuals and New Class members, the one truly unthinkable position is that God and the JudeoChristian tradition are very much alive and available to serve as the

Thus, President Reagan, after making specific reference to the call for freedom and peace spoken
by "a chosen people in a promised land" and by the Nazarene carpenter, declared:
So, let us remember the children and the future we want for them. And let us never forget
that this promise of peace and freedom, the gift that is ours as Americans, the gift that we
seek to share with all the world, depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which
it comes.
So, during this holy season, let us also reflect that in the prayers of simple people there
is more power and might than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the
earth. Let us then thank God for all His blessings to this nation, and ask Him for His help
and guidance so that we might continue the work of peace and foster the hope of a world
where human freedom is enshrined.
Id. at 1505-06.
125. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 123, at 169, 182-83; Bruce-Briggs, An Introduction to the
Idea of the New Class, in the THE NEW CLASS?, supra note 123, at 1; Kirkpatrick, Politics and
the New Class, in THE NEW CLASS?, supra note 123, at 33.
126. Cf. Bell, supra note 123, at 174-85; Bruce-Briggs, supra note 124; Gouldner, The New
Class Project, I, THEORY & SOC'Y 153, 168-76 (1978).
127. See Goulder, supra note 126, at 176-83.
128. In this respect, as in many others, the new class are the intellectual descendents of the
European Enlightenment, who perceived Christianity as the great enemy of reason and civilization. See P. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION. THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM
31-36 (1966). Although Gay claims that the Enlightenment's view of history as composed of ages
dominated either by reason and science or superstition and belief "will find few defenders today,"
id. at 36, the broad theme that modern intellectual life is made possible by the victory of Enlightenmentbyreason
over church
authority and theistic dogmatism is certainly still pervasive.
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true foundation of intellectual and moral life.
The apparently unholy alliance between business and New Class
interests, represented most forcefully in the mass media culture and
advertising, represents another explanation for the appearance of secularization of our society. As propagators of cultural symbols, New
Class intellectuals have a natural interest in unrestricted power to create, transform, and transmit the symbols by which the populace lives
and defines itself. The behavioral limitations and cultural identity provided by the Judeo-Christian tradition are potential barriers to such
unrestricted power; it has therefore been in the interest of some to ridicule, distort, ignore, and subdue theism's place in the hearts and minds
of the people. Business interests similarly have found it convenient to
replace traditional values of thrift, moderation, and altruism with those
of consumerism, lust, and possession as a means of fueling sales. Both
business and intellectual elites gain from the displacement of traditional Judeo-Christian values and symbols. Business elites gain an insatiable consumer demand for goods and services; intellectual elites, the
freedom to reshape the identity of a people based on the concept nearest and dearest to their hearts, the absolute, radical autonomy of each
individual.12 9 The business excesses facilitated by the overthrow of
Judeo-Christian values can then serve as a basis for furthering government regulation, an arena amply suited to the New Class' threefold
agenda of indoctrinating, caring, and planning. 3 The intellectuals of
the New Class, purveyors of cultural symbols and managers of governmental and private institutions, are positioned as the seducers and the
conscience of the destabilized, rootless masses,"'1 luring with the carrots of freed instinctual satisfaction, while simultaneously chastising
with the rod of government regulation of personal, familial, and economic life.
Some commentators perceive New Class members, or modern intellectuals, as engaged in a rebellion against the human condition itself.
Gender differences, the biological continuum of human procreation
(heterosexual intercourse, pregnancy, childbirth, mother nursing child),
the human propensity to evil in thought and deed, human isolation and
alienation, are sometimes portrayed by modern intellectuals as limitations that autonomous human beings can and should overcome. Having

129. Cf. D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976); Bell, supra
note 123, at 185-89; Vree, Christianity, Communism, and Sexual Revolution (pts. 1-6), NEW
OXFORD REV., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 12, NEW OXFORD REV., Mar. 1983, at 10, NEW OXFORD REV.,
Apr. 1983, at 22, NEW OXFORD REV:, May 1983, at 8, NEW OXFORD REV., June 1983, at 14,
NEW OXFORD REV., July-Aug. 1983, at 8.
130. See Berger, supra note 123, at 49, 53.
131. Cf Bell, supra note 123, at 169, 185.
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eliminated God, the first enemy of autonomy, the New Class rebels
against the remaining limitations imposed by the human condition and
human nature. Of course the old nemesis, death, which cannot be overcome by naturalistic means or mere force of will, creates an overshad132
owing gloom in the works of many who urge us to create ourselves.
Nonetheless, many see in the persistent moralism of the New Class a
frustrated desire to find and create in human life those goods that appropriately can be supplied only by a transcendent force. This desire
creates a sometimes unrealistic view of the degree to which suffering

and evil can be overcome in human life. It is difficult, of course, to
separate those things that can and ought to be changed from those that
are either intractable or correct. The Christian life is a ceaseless struggle against the evil both within and without, but Christianity also
teaches that ultimate victory is not achievable in this world or life, and
is not achieved through human autonomy but rather through divine
sovereignty. 133 No doubt many human evils have been self-servingly described as inevitable or necessary; the prophet's passion for justice is a
common heritage of Judaism and Christianity. Yet, among many intellectuals it is possible to discern a whining quality, a refusal to accept
the very fact of limitations or suffering or evil, that is more akin to a
toddler's temper tantrum than to a prophet's call. Indeed, commentators have suggested that the New Class attributes of moralism, rebellion against limitations, surprised horror at human suffering, and over-

132. Many twentieth-century philosophers and writers appear gloomy not only because of
death, but also in view of, variously, the absence of God, the absurdity of the human condition,
and the view that human beings are merely determined accidental creations of the physical universe. See, e.g., C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS
12-14 (1932); S. BECKET, WAITING FOR GODOT (1954); 5 W. JONES, supra note 43, at 157,
197-99, 332-63 (Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre). Carl Becker quotes Bertrand Russell as
follows:
That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving;
that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought
and feeling can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of all the
ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius are
destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of
man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins-all
these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which
rejects them can hope to stand.
C. BECKER. supra. at 13-14 (quoting B. RUSSELL. supra note 42, at 47).
This apparently gloomy ultimate prognosis does not prevent Bertrand Russell from urging us
to bring about mankind's happy, glorious, and joyful future. See B. RUSSELL, HAS MAN A FuTURE? 126 (1961).
133. One thinks of Martin Luther's magnificent hymn, A Mighty Fortress Is Our God,
which declares: "Did we in our own strength confide, our striving would be losing ....
We will
not fear, for God hath willed His truth to triumph through us." Luther, A Mighty Fortress Is Our
God (F.
trans.), in1987
THE HYMNAL OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, no. 551 (1940).
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riding emphasis on individual autonomy are traceable to the often both
very permissive and very protective upbringing of members of the New
Class.' 34 We (for I recognize myself here) were encouraged to construct our own world, our own visions of reality, while simultaneously
being protected from having these soap bubble worlds popped by real-

ity's pins.'
The child-rearing techniques being discussed are principally those
of America's upper middle class; the dislike of some for that class and
their offspring is evident. 3 There is apparently substantial overlap between the New Class and the upper middle class.137 Whatever one
thinks of the sociological or psychological critiques of these classes, the
critiques illustrate several important points. First, the social science
techniques by which secularist intellectuals have historically ridiculed
the religiously inclined are a two-edged sword: Label the religiously
inclined as authoritarian personality types"3 8 and be prepared to receive
back the label of tantrum-throwing toddler; 39 explain religious beliefs
with the reductionist tools of social science, and be prepared to have
your secular beliefs explained with those same tools. Indeed, a social

134. Berger, supra note 123, at 50-54; Vree, supra note 129.
135. See Berger, supra note 123, at 53-54.
136. See id. at 54 (discussing relationship between upper-middle class and New Class approaches to child-rearing); Vree, supra note 129 (noting child-rearing techniques of the uppermiddle class and their relationship to the sexual revolution, and displaying strong dislike for the
American upper-middle class).
137. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 123, at 54; Vree, supra note 129; Ladd, Pursuing the
New Class: Social Theory and Survey Data, in THE NEW CLASS?, supra note 123, at 101.
138. See, e.g., E. FROMM, supra note 39, 82-83 (1941) (Luther's personality and teachings
display typical traits of the authoritarian character). Richard Neuhaus reacts to the charge that
fundamentalist religion may be dismissed as "mere pandering" to the authoritarian personality by
suggesting that personality development leads progressively from the authoritarian to the autonomous and then finally to the authoritative:
Instead of thinking only about the authoritarian and autonomous, we should pay attention
to yet another kind of personality, namely, the person who recognizes what is authoritative
[A]utonomy alone, thought of as unqualified fulfillment of self, is a new oppression.
....
Religious geniuses such as Paul, Augustine, and Luther viewed such autonomy as the oppression of the imperial self, the source and shape of our alienation from God. Beyond
autonomy is the free acknowledgment of that by which we are bound. We are bound to be
free. We are bound to be free in the sense of being called or destined to freedom. And we
are bound to be free in the sense that our freedom is only actualized in the free acceptance
of that which authoritatively claims our assent and obedience.
R. NEUHAUS, supra note 112, at 17-18.
139. See. e.g., Vree (pt. 3), supra note 129, at 22-23. Dale Vree quotes Jerry Rubin as
having stated in 1971:
I knew they [my parents] loved me so much that if I cried I'd get my way, if I screamed
I'd get my way, if I insisted I'd get my way. It was really total toleration, total permissiveness ....
I'm really convinced that the whole of my recent activity in the movement [New
Left] has been a playing out on a massive political scale of the things I learned in the
family.
Id. at 22.
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science perspective that assumes that theistic beliefs are purely explainable through deterministic social and cultural factors by implication
assumes that the lack of theistic beliefs is similarly explainable.
This is not the place to fully develop a theory that accounts for the
degree, however poor, to which social science generalizations have predictive power and also allows room for human free agency.14 Nor is
this the place to fully describe a theistic theory that accounts for causation, human responsibility, and divine sovereignty, creation, and intervention. It should be sufficient to agree, as rules of discourse, that social science data and interpretation are useful as partial explanations of
human behavior and belief, but that such theories do not possess either
the explanatory or predictive power to eliminate, as a matter of proof
rather than ideology, human free agency or divine action as additional
foci of great import. It is fair, then, to discuss those causative social
factors that might influence a class, group, or individual to either hold
or not hold certain beliefs, so long as such causative factors are not
held out as 'completely deterministic, and so long as the discussion is
not taken to have subsumed the separate discussion of whether those
beliefs are true. It is, moreover, equally fair to subject the intellectual
classes to such scrutiny, for we cannot and should not assume that being intellectually inclined or engaged somehow frees one from the influence of social, causative factors.
Second, the above review of the New Class and related literature
suggests that both the nature of intellectual work and the social, economic, and cultural position of those conducting such work constitute
secularizing influences.
Third, while the secularizing influences on the intellectual classes
do not demonstrate either the error or the correctness of secularist beliefs, examination of such factors should lead to a reconsideration of
the "peculiar division between academic and religious thought in our
culture," to use James Boyd White's phrasing. 4 White suggests that
the division is peculiar because it is relatively new in Western society,
because religious sentiment remains so vibrant in America outside of
the academy, and because the division suggests a radical dichotomy
between rationality and religion that distorts the nature of each. 4" A
substantive debate on the appropriateness of the division would cer-

140. Cf. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 79-108. Note should also be taken of Professor
Berman's call for a new social theory of law with a more sophisticated view of causation and law,
for "the fact that Hegel was wrong in supposing that consciousness determines being does not
mean that Marx was right in saying that being determines consciousness." See H. BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION, THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 44 (1983).
141. White, supra note 1.
142. Id.
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tainly appear to be in order.
4.

The Descent of the Enlightenment Tradition

The disdain of many among our intellectual elite for theistic belief
is particularly ironic in that many of the competing traditions are derivative, at least in part, from the Judeo-Christian tradition and share
many of its premises. The irony is deepened when we note that a number of those premises of the competing intellectual traditions which are
not shared by the Judeo-Christian tradition have generally come to be
seen as false. It is, moreover, the failure of the competing secular traditions, in combination with the intellectual exiling of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which has led to the relativism that so many find destructive to us as a culture, a nation, and a people.
Many of the competing secular ideologies in American legal and
political thought are descendants, in one way or another, of the European Enlightenment. 14 3 The premises shared by the Judeo-Christian
tradition and the Enlightenment thinkers are essentially the inherent
worth and dignity of human beings, both individually and as a species.
The morality of the Enlightenment was at the outset largely a borrowed Judeo-Christian morality. 4 The political theory of the Enlightenment-particularly that of John Locke-can be traced ultimately to
Christian Europe's changing views on religious and political authority. " 5 Kant's morality and Locke's politics represent shared premises,

143. The emphasis on rights theory, whether that of the left or right, is a descendent of
Enlightenment thought. See, e.g., E. CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 234-53
(Koelln & Pettegrove trans. 1951) (Ist German ed. 1932). Marx, who perceived natural rights
theory as a product of the material conditions of the bourgeoisie, see 4 W. JONES. supra note 43,
at 189-90 (quoting F. ENGELS, SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC 3-4 (E. Aveling trans.
1892)), owes much to Hegel and Kant, see id. at 178, 192, and "belongs . . . to that empirical
and scientific tradition that combined Condorcet's optimistic belief in the inevitability of 'progress'
with the belief that human nature as well as the physical universe conforms to simple 'laws' that
can be discovered by science." Id. at 178. Feminism also has roots in the European Enlightenment, although modern feminists find much Enlightenment literature quite unenlightened in its
discussion of the role and nature of women. See, e.g., M. CONDORCET, SELECTED WRITINGS
97-103 (K. Baker ed. 1976); E. HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 20, 416
(1972); C. MONTESQUIEU, Letters xxvi, xxxviii, lxiii, in THE PERSIAN LETTERS 46-48, 65-66,
105-06 (G. Healy trans. 1964); S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 99-230
(1979).
144. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 51.
145.

See B. TIERNEY, RELIGION. LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT,

1150-1650 (1982). Tierney notes in particular the influence of George Lawson, an English clergyman, on Locke. See id. at 81 (citing Maclean, George Lawson and John Locke, 9 CAMBRIDGE
HIs. J. 68 (1947); J. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY (Cambridge
1978)). The broad theme of Tierney's work is that Western constitutional thought arose out of a
long series of Christian writers and specific historical events, beginning with the canonists of the
twelfth century. For a similar but broader treatment of the significance of the canonists, and of
the influence of Christianity on Western law, see H. BERMAN, supra note 140. The broad thesis of
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particularly with Christian Europe, largely because they are derivative

from Christian Europe.
The Judeo-Christian tradition, however, looks to the creator God
as the source of that worth and that morality. The Enlightenment philosophers broke with Judeo-Christian premises by attempting to locate
the authority for their morality and politics apart from God, typically
in either human reason or human nature. The Enlightenment was
based on the confidence that human reason alone could find and
demonstrate objective truths about issues such as morality and politics-or at least on the confidence that human reason could provide a
better guide than had theistic revelation.1 46 In contrast, although the
Judeo-Christian tradition contains competing views on the role of reason, it relies ultimately on revelation, rather than reason, as its authority. Some Enlightenment thinkers, moreover, accompanied their faith
in human reason with a confidence in the predominant goodness of
human nature. 1 7 The Judeo-Christian tradition, by contrast, while cognizant of God's creation of humans in His image, has emphasized-through the doctrine of the Fall-the inherently flawed, sinful,
and self-destructive human nature.
It is precisely those Enlightenment premises which broke with the
Judeo-Christian tradition that moderns find most naive and flawed.

Tierney and Berman would apply equally to other writers also influential in America's founding,
such as Blackstone, Coke, Rutherford, Burlamaqui, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Montesquieu. See, e.g.,
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 860-65 (1978) (noting the importance of writers other than
Locke to American Revolutionary Thought); cf. B. TIERNEY, supra, at 54-79 (development of
federalism from thirteenth century to Althusius, Grotius, and Pufendorf).
146. On the Enlightenment confidence in reason, and hostility toward Christianity, see generally E. CASSIRER, supra note 143; C. BECKER, supra note 132; P. GAY, supra note 128. There
was to some degree a progression to the Enlightenment, with early philosophers often being of at
least nominal and sometimes quite sincere Christian convictions, followed by a movement toward
Deism and then finally religious skepticism. The early thinkers, such as Newton and Locke, could
believe Christianity and reason to be in sound accord; later Enlightenment figures believed the two
to conflict, and chose reason as their guide. See, e.g., H. MAY, supra note 58, at 3-25; P. GAY,
supra note 128, at 39-68.
Some Enlightenment philosophers, such as the famed skeptic David Hume, built their reputations by attempting to demonstrate that reason could not demonstrate objective truth; some also
emphasized empiricism. Skeptics showed confidence in human reason, however, to the extent that
they perceived the alleged unreasonableness of Christianity as a sufficient ground to reject it. In
this sense even a supposed radical skeptic, by choosing human reason over divine revelation, can
show his or her underlying confidence in, and preference for, his or her own reasoning powers.
Empiricism, of course, implies confidence in the human faculties of both observation and inductive
reasoning; to the extent that empiricism is viewed as an exclusive criterion of truth which denies
the validity of theistic truth, it also represents both confidence in human reasoning and a choice of
human reason over divine revelation.
147. On the Enlightenment rejection of the Christian doctrine of the Fall, and some varying
Enlightenment views on human nature and the origin of evil, see E. CASSIRER, supra note 143, at
137-60.
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Hundreds of years of rational discourse on ethics and politics, and then
on rationality and language, have taught us that human rationality in
itself is painfully indeterminate." 8 The twentieth century has reminded
us that human beings remain consistently capable of the most heinous
and brutal evil. We have looked for a basis for morality and politics in
our natures and our capacity to reason, and the mirror of our collective
experiences is a sight virtually unbearable to behold.
Alasdair Maclntyre's recent critique of the Enlightenment project
traces our descent into relativism. The Enlightenment philosophers, according to Maclntyre, attempted to justify morality apart from theological, theistic premises, and apart from the Aristotelian view of the
essence and end of man. Thus Maclntyre, discussing Kant, notes:
On Kant's view it can never follow from the fact that God commands us
to do such-and-such that we ought to do such-and-such. In order for us
to reach such a conclusion justifiably we would also have to know that
we always ought to do what God commands. But this last we could not
know unless we ourselves possessed a standard of moral judgment independent of God's commandments by means of which we could judge
God's deeds and words and so find the latter morally worthy of obedience. But clearly if we 49
possess such a standard, the commandments of
God will be redundant.
Maclntyre notes that many of the great Enlightenment philosophers agreed "to a surprising degree on the content and character of
the precepts which constitute genuine morality," precisely because they
had inherited them "from their shared Christian past."' 5 ° However, as
each philosopher failed in his turn to find a basis apart from God's
authority by which to justify their essentially Christian morality, the
seeds were sown for Nietzsche's clear-headed recognition that if God is
dead, then so is God's morality. The project, in other words, of justifying Christian morality by reference to human nature, or human sentiment, or human reason, was an abysmal failure; without any justification, the system of morality itself was ready for dismantling.
The important point to realize here is that Nietzsche's amoral call
for a great man, whose only morality is his own will to power, is simply
a natural by-product of Kant's premise that we should not do something merely because God has commanded it.' Nietzsche is famous

148. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 17, at 905 & n. 162 (noting modern skepticism regarding
Enlightenment reason, and suggesting relation of this skepticism to various legal theories).
149. A. MACIN rYRE, supra note 14, at 44-45.
150. Id. at 51.
151. It is noteworthy that Kant, elsewhere in his work, conceded that morality without a
teleological framework was unintelligible. Kant therefore, after having apparently previously
abandoned God as a basis for morality, smuggled Him in through the back door as a presupposi-
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for that illogical slogan, God is dead. The slogan, however powerful, is
illogical because, if the theistic God ever lived, he clearly could not
have died. What can die, however, are our beliefs and confidence in
God. Nietzsche's slogan is arguably descriptive of a sort of palace coup,
where God, properly enthroned in the human heart, is "killed" so that
the new king, self, may be enthroned in His place. Nietzsche, however,
is not the culprit; he is merely a reporter of events past. For once we
accept Kant's premise that we only obey God if we can find rational
justifications for His commands, the coup has already occurred: for we
have given our ultimate allegiance to human reason, rather than to
God. Human reason, moreover, has turned out to be capricious.1 52
Maclntyre informs us that Nietzsche's great man is not an aberration in "the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but
rather one more representative moment in its internal unfolding."' 53
Maclntyre, of course, is not alone in tracing our cultural heritage, with
its increasingly destructive relativism, to Nietzsche. 5" Doing so is most
useful because it forces us to look more honestly at what we are becoming: a culture of isolated great selves, with less and less to mediate
conflicts between us. It is also useful because it forces us to realize that
such is the necessary conclusion of our willing acceptance of the terms
of the Enlightenment project-that we must attempt to define morality
without reference to God and the norms He has revealed to us.
A brief point can be made about the suggestion of some, such as
Allan Bloom, that the classical philosophical tradition be the centerpiece of our civilization. Any system of absolutes, once accepted by a
society as a valid set of first premises, can avoid some of the pitfalls of
relativism; while only true premises actually avoid tyranny, widely held
premises, whether true or not, at least provide for societal cohesion and
cultural identity. Assigning a secular version of the classical tradition
to this status, however, is inherently self-contradictory and thereby subject to a return descent into relativism. The classical tradition, as
brought to us through the Enlightenment thinkers, posits human reason
as an adequate and effective means of finding and demonstrating ethical and political truths. Yet it is precisely the ineffectiveness of human
reason as a means of demonstrating truth that has produced our pre-

tion of practical reasoning. See id. at 56. The Enlightenment project as a whole, however, was
consistent with Kant's original premise, and proceeded willy-nilly, and ultimately unsuccessfully,
in its task of supporting morality without reference to God.
152. Pascal had warned that reason without revelation must end in skepticism. See E. Cassirer, supra note 143, at 141-46.
153. A. MACINTYRE. supra note 14, at 259.
154. See A. BLOOM, supra note 7, at 141-56, 194-240; P. JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES 48
(1983).
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sent predicament. Even Maclntyre, in discussing the choice between
Nietzsche and Aristotle, notes:
Arguments in philosophy rarely take the form of proofs . . . .Consequently those who wish to resist some particular conclusions are equally
rarely without any resort . . . .We can often establish the truth in areas
where no proof is available. But when an issue is settled, it is often because the contending parties-or someone from among them-have
stood back from their dispute and asked in a systematic way what the
appropriate rational procedures are for settling this particular kind of
dispute.1""
Clearly the choice of one among many rational procedures for settling philosophical disputes is analogous to the choice of procedures for
settling political disputes. That choice is itself not open to rational
proof, and its selection necessarily entails the apparently arbitrary selection of the appropriate characteristics of truth, just as in the political
realm one must select the appropriate characteristics of persons in settling disputes over goods and services. Thus, for example, Maclntyre
suggests a return to Aristotelianism because it "restores intelligibility
and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments."1'56
Maclntyre has thus chosen intelligibility and rationality as the criteria
for choosing among competing systems of thought, or competing truthclaims. He has not, however, previously shown that in reality truth possesses those characteristics. In philosophy as in religion, wishing it so
doesn't make it so. While we might prefer the truth to be intelligible
and rational, the unproven assertion that it is requires (from a secular
relativist perspective) a leap of faith similar to that made by the believer in a loving God. This leap of faith, moreover, has two components: Faith that reality itself has certain characteristics and faith that
we, through our human faculty of reason, are capable of discerning
such characteristics. A further aspect of this faith is the implicit belief
that particular philosophers in a certain time and place succeeded,
through the use of their reason, in discovering truths that somehow escaped other thinkers in other times and places. There is, however,
something implausible, unsatisfying, and even self-contradictory about
urging us to put our faith in human reason, when we as a culture and
people have found human reason to be so capricious and indeterminate.
It is as though we were instructed to forget all of our failures, and
somehow through force of will to pretend that human reason had succeeded precisely where it had failed.
Theism, by contrast, has a certain plausibility. It does not require

155.
156.

A. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 259-60.
Id. at 259.
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us to believe that human reason is a sufficient guide for our thoughts
and actions. As Professor Leff has noted, it makes sense that God, if
He exists, would be capable of establishing what is good and true. God
by definition is so capable; we, either as individuals or a species, may
not be so capable. God is simply a more plausible source for establishing the good and the true than is either human reason or human nature. This does not make theism true; again, wishing it so doesn't make
it so. But it makes the intellectual snobbery surrounding theism all but
incomprehensible. Intellectuals apparently discount theism in order to
obtain and retain the pride and power that comes with being the discoverer and pronouncer of truth.15 7 The Enlightenment, Bloom tells us,
was designed to effectuate the rule of the philosopher-kings.15 8
The reign of the philosopher-kings, unfortunately, has had a way
of giving way to the reign of Nietzsche's great man. The rule of human
reason almost inevitably descends into relativism precisely because, as
Maclntyre concedes, those "who wish to resist some particular conclusion are . . . rarely without any resort": those who lose disputes can
always claim that it was will, rather than reason, which necessitated
such loss. Society's outcasts and dissident intellectuals spread the view
that the legitimating principle of reason is merely a disguise, as Nietzsche accused, for the imposition of one will upon another. The stage is
set for society to disintegrate into a community, if the term can so be
used, of great men. Specific individuals may seek to attain the full
measure of Nietzsche's ideal, and rule others through the raw imposition of their will. Hitler is the prototype of such a great man. 59
This paper at the outset noted Professor Leff's proposition that
even Hitler's regime cannot definitively be condemned without reference to God. One response to this proposition might be that it is sufficient to be able, as a society, to agree subjectively to condemn Hitler's
acts. Agreeing that there are no provable objective principles, we would
nonetheless as a society subjectively hold to certain principles. Alternatively, we could as a society make the leap of faith necessary to establish the doctrine of inalienable rights, for example, as an objective
value. We could on this basis support the principles of the Declaration
of Independence and the Bill of Rights, even as we would ignore the

157. James White appears to implicitly acknowledge this possibility when he notes that
perhaps the members of the secular academy fear religious truth. See White, supra note 1. Religious truth threatens the absolute autonomy of mind and monopolistic control over cultural truth
sought by some secular academics; fear may therefore be an understandable, if not appropriate,
response. Cf Leff, supra note 3, at 1229 (we desire the freedom to create and choose the right and
good, while simultaneously desiring to be ruled by discernible, authoritative rules).
158. See A. BLOOM, supra note 7, at 266.
159. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 259; P. JOHNSON, supra note 154.
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particularized Judeo-Christian morality that arguably gives support to
those principles. We would then agree to embrace Lincoln's premise of
America as an unfolding of those premises, but the principles of rights,
and ultimately of liberty, freedom, and equality, would be cleansed of
their Judeo-Christian roots. I would take this suggested course of action as being the project of much of liberal, and even conservative, legal scholarship: liberals seek to assist the spread of a list of freedoms
and rights encompassing, for example, procreative and privacy rights
on the one hand, and subsistence and development rights on the other;
conservatives emphasize property rights, majoritarian rule, and freedom from victimization by criminal behavior. This demonstrates the
obvious problem with embracing a secularized Lincolnian premise: any
cause can be garbed in the rhetoric of freedom, in part because every
cause, and its opposite, posits a realm where government should either
stay out (freedom from government) or act protectively (freedom provided by government). 160
The indeterminacy of concepts such as freedom and equality has,
of course, long been understood. What has not been sufficiently understood is that the exiling of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and consequent emptying of the ideals of freedom and equality of their original
meanings, creates a situation where we not only cannot objectively condemn Hitlerian acts, but where we, as a society, fail to even subjectively condemn or prevent similarly evil acts within our own society.
The project of continuing Lincoln's march toward equality and freedom
with indeterminate, subjective conceptions of those terms is a project
likely to produce institutions as abominable as those, such as slavery,
that the project was initially created specifically to avoid.
The demonstration of this last point is both highly controversial
and quite simple; it requires a discussion of that most emotional of issues, abortion. 16 ' Abortion is an issue on which both sides can, and do,
claim to have the force of the secularized Lincolnian premise on their
side. Pro-choice advocates view the right of women to control their bodies and the procreative process as a part of a new species of rights that
are nonetheless inherent in the march toward a greater realization of
freedom (women's freedom from state regulation in procreative matters) and equality (women, through control of the procreative process,
attaining equality with men). The revocation of the abortion right
would no doubt be considered by some as a retreat to a kind of slavery:
160. Cf. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982) (equality an
empty principle, a mere tautology).
161. Maclntyre chooses abortion, along with debates over the morality of war and government regulation, to demonstrate the "interminable" nature of modern moral debate. See A.
MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 6-1I.
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the ownership by society and by men of women's bodies. In contrast,
pro-life advocates view the abortion right as an infringement-indeed,
as the inequitable denial-of the basic freedom to live. The characteristics of developmental stage, physical location, and physical dependency,
the pro-life community believe, are not sufficient to support a deviation
from the legal principles that forbid the taking of innocent life. The
pro-life community also perceives the abortion right in terms of the
Lincolnian premise, except that they see the establishment of that right
as a march backwards, toward the institution of a practice as contrary
to the Lincolnian premise as was slavery itself. Thus the view that
abortion on demand is a practice morally equivalent to slavery has been
given careful elucidation by James Burtchaell,' 62 voiced by President
Reagan,'16 3 and characterized as "plausible" by the late Robert Cover,
himself a veteran of the civil rights struggle."" The comparison to the
Nazi death camps, and to the Weimar and Nazi programs of "mercykilling," has similarly been made. 6 '
How, based on a relativist, subjectivist moral theory, are we to
choose? Our embrace of a secularized Lincolnian premise is useless to
us in deciding, because the premise, purified of particularistic, JudeoChristian principles, supports either conclusion. Each side, moreover,
would or does view its opponent's victory as establishing a practice
morally equivalent to slavery. It is therefore, as I argued, likely that we
will choose a path leading to a societal practice as evil as that which
the secularized Lincolnian premise was specifically designed to avoid.
We have something on the order of a fifty-fifty chance. Indeed, given
our inability to objectively show the loser the propriety of his or her
loss, it is certain that we must institute a practice that a significant
segment of society considers to be the moral equivalent of slavery.
While realization of the dangers of the indeterminacy of the secularized Lincolnian premise is important, the full weight of my argument against the relativist legal mindset requires acceptance of the prolife view that abortion is the taking of innocent human life. Abortion,
thus defined, places the relativist-absolutist debate in a radically different light. This point can best be made by brief reference to the recent
history of the relativist-absolutist debate.

J. BURTCHAELL, RACHEL WEEPING 239-87 (1982).
Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of a Nation, in ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 19, 27-29, 36-38 (1984).
164. See Cover, The Bounds of Constitutional Interpretation:Of the Word, the Deed. and
the Role, 20 GA. L. REV. 815, 832 (1986). Cover's comments center on the interpretation of Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), "as the Dred Scott v. Sandford [60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)]
of our day." Id. (footnote omitted).
165. See, e.g., J. BURTCHAELL, supra note 162, at 141-238; Muggeridge, The Humane HolTHE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION, supra note 163.
ocaust,
ABORTION AND
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Catholic intellectuals have argued for some fifty years that certain
absolutes, including belief in God and in a substantive moral law, were
requisites of democracy, and that the replacement of those absolutes
with moral relativism had produced the totalitarian regimes of the
twentieth century. The reply from relativist intellectuals was that absolutism of all kinds is dangerous and inimical to democracy: Catholicism
and totalitarianism, both being absolutist, were bedfellows; relativism
and democracy, both being pluralistic and pragmatic, were virtual
symbiotic twins. The relativists clearly won the hearts and minds of the
intellectual classes, if not those of the people themselves.""
The debate has nonetheless continued: the English Catholic Paul
Johnson recently published a history of the twentieth century that
presents the atrocities, tyrannies, and chaos of recent history as the
unleashing of Nietzsche's will to power, as a consequence of the embracing of relativism and the general failure of the Christian faith. 16 71
Rawls' much-lauded work, A Theory of Justice,18 synthesized in
Kantian, natural-law terminology the relativist view that particular
conceptions of the good, including moral and religious absolutisms,
must by definition be excluded when constructing the theoretical basis
of the modern, liberal, democratic state.
The absolutist argument has traditionally suffered from a certain
weakness: it contended that moral relativism had caused the moral vacuum that produced Hitler and Stalin, but it could not really succeed in
making the establishment liberal, however much a relativist, really
equivalent to, or directly responsible for, the atrocities produced by
such men. Labeling totalitarian dictators and establishment liberals relativists proves no more than the corollary practice of labeling fascists
and Catholics absolutists. There are, arguably, different sorts of relativists, and different sorts of absolutists.
Western liberal intellectuals did, of course, for a time manage to
make fools of themselves in their embrace of Stalin and Soviet Russia. 6' Nonetheless, they have for the most part repented of such errors,
and have maintained the integrity of their tradition as one that embraces the progressive march of human freedom and dignity against all
forms of mistreatment and tyranny. Western liberals stand in principle

166. These debates, which occurred to a significant degree among legal scholars, are described in detail in Edward Purcell, Jr.'s very helpful study. See E. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973).
167. See P. JOHNSON, supra note 154.
168. See J. RAWLS, supra note 30.
169. See, e.g., P. JOHNSON, supra note 154, at 260, 275-77 (citing P. HOLLANDER. POLITICAL PILGRIMS: TRAVELS OF WESTERN INTELLECTUALS TO THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND CUBA

1928-1978

(1981)).
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against the Gulag Archipelago and Auschwitz, and against Cuban and
Argentinian human-rights abuses.
The story of humanity, from the Western liberal perspective, is
one that cautions that beliefs in absolutes (other than human autonomy) have a consistent tendency to produce tyranny, prejudice, war,
and divisiveness. This association is reflected in the quotation from
James Boyd White that opens this paper, as he warns that "[o]ur fears
of religious oppression, and perhaps our fears of religious truth, lead us
to maintain a false ideology .... ,,17o Allan Bloom's lament is that the
predominant mindset has become so frightened of absolutes that it no
longer is willing to search for the truth; since the truth is such a dangerous commodity, it might be better to run from it than toward it.
Abortion, at least when viewed as the taking of innocent human
life, places the relativist-absolutist debate in a radically new context
because it constitutes the great crime against humanity of the relativist, liberal establishment. Just as German Fascism produced the Holocaust, and Soviet Marxism produced the Gulag, American establishment liberalism, assisted by feminists and the extreme left, produced
mass abortion on demand.' 7 1
Indeed, Roe v. Wade 72 is the embodiment and the culmination of
the legal relativist tradition. The Justices of the Supreme Court, faced
with a question that they admitted to be of some difficulty, responded
by declaring it unresolvable, and hence handed it over to each individual woman. They would not decide when human life began; but they
did agree that the law for the first two trimesters would not protect the
fetus, whatever it was. They decided the legal question by declaring the
moral question out of order. 7 3
Roe reflects the liberal relativist assumption that divisive and difficult moral questions cannot be answered by the state, but must instead
be answered by each individual. The contrasting conservative, relativist
assumption is that appointed Justices may not take difficult moral questions away from the majoritarian, democratic processes without direct
authority from that great compact, the historical Constitution. Thus,
the debate between, for example, Justice Brennan and Judge Bork is
about who should decide: a question of procedure. Judge Bork's ap-

170. White, supra note I.
171. Abortion is a world-wide phenomenon; rejection and acceptance of abortion can occur
for a variety of reasons in various countries. In this context, I am speaking only of the acceptance
of mass abortion on demand in America.
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. See id. at 152-66. John Noonan and Charles Rice, both Catholic legal scholars, hve
made the closely-related argument that Roe reflects the positivism of Hans Kelsen. See Noonan,
The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade. 63 NEB. L. REV. 668 (1984); Rice, The Dred Scott Case of
the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1059 (1973).
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proach would tend to promote Judeo-Christian absolutist morality because the people, on the whole, still subscribe to such morality to a far
greater degree than do the intellectual classes from which the judiciary
are drawn. Judge Bork, however, may be more of a moral relativist
than Justice Brennan is; he may be as comfortable with abortion on
demand as a matter of social policy as Justice Brennan is. The relativist approach appears to so dominate both liberal and conservative legal
reasoning that there is almost no available legal language left by which
it can be simply declared, even in a dissenting opinion, that abortion on
demand-which involves the violent mass destruction of innocent
human life-is simply wrong.
The continuing descent of the Enlightenment is revealed both in
the inability of our legal system to maintain a method of discourse by
which it can morally condemn and legally prevent mass abortion on
demand, and also by the increasingly brutal manner in which abortion
on demand is defended. The Supreme Court had before it in Roe briefs
describing fetal development and containing the familiar photographs
of the human form of the fetus. 7 4 It is striking that all of the Justices,
including the dissenting Justices, chose to pass over in silence the actual characteristics of the fetus. The only characteristic of fetuses considered relevant was viability, which is primarily a relational characteristic defined by the fetus' ability to survive without the assistance of
his or her mother. What fetuses are, in and for themselves-the development of their brain, heart, and other organs, their appearance, their
activities, their experience-was deemed unworthy of discussion.
The Justices thus dehumanized their victims, and maintained a
semblance of humanitarianism. By specifically declaring that the Court
need not decide when human life begins, and by foregoing all discussion of the characteristics of the fetus, Justice Blackmun avoided having to state that women had been permitted to kill their babies. His
implicit statement, however, was merely one step away: women would
be permitted to have abortions even if, "in the development of man's
knowledge," it later was learned that they had been killing their babies."" The second implicit message of Roe, which is directed specifi-

174. Appellee's Brief at 29-53, Roe, reprinted in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS
264 (P. Kurkland & G. Gasper eds. 1975); Amicus Brief of Certain Physicians, Roe, reprinted in
75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra, at 381.
175. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Justice Blackmun thus stated:
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is
present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in
protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of
when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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cally at women, is more devastating still: you may legally obtain an
17 6
abortion even if you believe that you are killing your baby.
The Court's slippery avoidance of the nature and characteristics of
the fetus has never been particularly convincing; it was bound to lead
those who must continue the debate to the point of having to justify
more forthrightly-and thus more brutally-the abortion right. Thus,
Professor Laurence Tribe, writing some twelve years after Roe, finally
conceded: "the more people have learned about the fetus as a growing
being with brain waves and familiar human features, the stronger have
been the feelings of many that the woman's freedom is pitted against a
genuine baby's life. '17 7 Tribe has thus been forced to produce what the
Court avoided: a defense of mass abortion on demand in the context of
the assumption that "pre-viable fetuses [are] full human beings.' 78
Tribe does not commit himself to the view that pre-viable fetuses are
full human beings; what he argues, however, is that this view is plausible, and that, even if it is fully true, it should not change the result in
Roe. Thus, while the Court claimed that states could not protect previable fetuses because there is no consensus on their status, Tribe is
arguing that, even if we all agreed that fetuses are full human beings,
we must allow women to kill them. The question of the humanity of the
fetus is consequently rendered irrelevant, because the answer cannot
179
affect the result.
Tribe's defense of abortion as killing follows quite logically from
Roe's use of the relational standard of viability as the only relevant
characteristic of the fetus. Human beings, Tribe argues, may be killed
by those upon whom they are uniquely dependent, precisely because of
that dependency. The child-even when acknowledged as a full human
being-has no inherent right to demand of his or her mother the favor
of being carried to viability, and society would be wrong to force the
mother to do so. Establishment liberalism, which has often championed

Id. (emphasis added).
176. Justice Blackmun conceded that the view that human life begins at conception was
both the "official belief of the Catholic Church . . . [and] is a view strongly held by many nonCatholics as well, and by many physicians." Id. at 161. Probably, the view that human life begins
at conception, when combined with the view that it begins at some point well within the first, and
certainly, the second trimester, are sufficiently widespread to put most women having abortions in
the position of admitting to themselves, either before or after the abortion, that they have killed
their child.
A recent pro-choice essay in the Sunday New York Times Magazine declared: "[T]he fact is,
when your back is against the wall of an unwanted pregnancy, it doesn't matter whether or not
you think the fetus is a person." Pollitt, Children of Choice, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, Magazine, at 28, 30.
177. L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 17 (1985).
178. L. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1354.
See id. at 1352-59.
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the cause of the weak and dependent, declares unique dependency the
primary characteristic of legal nonpersonhood.1 80
Tribe makes it clear that he supports abortion rights largely because lack of access to abortion disadvantages women relative to
men. 18 1 The choice of establishment liberalism and feminism1 82 is clear:
to equalize men and women, they will allow women to kill their babies.
The descent of the Enlightenment may not be complete, but its nature
should be sufficiently clear.
I do not want to overstate my position. The pro-life community has,
among its notable members some prominent liberals. There is a sense
in which the pro-life cause would naturally fit the establishment liberal
agenda, for the cause seeks to protect a group whose members quite
literally cannot protect themselves. Rarely before, moreover, has establishment liberalism been willing to carry the relativist agenda to the
point of allowing one human being to physically injure or kill another;
typically, the principle of relativism is halted at the point when direct
harm to an innocent other is contemplated. American liberalism could
still repent of its broad-based allegiance to mass abortion on demand,
and recoup at least a good portion of its ideological consistency.
Such a turnabout, however logical, unfortunately seems extremely
unlikely. The broad support of American liberalism for mass abortion
on demand, despite increasing acknowledgment of the human characteristics of the fetus, does not seem to be seriously waning. The Democratic party, an important institutional voice of establishment liberalism, seems incapable of sustaining a serious anti-abortion Presidential
candidacy; at least that appears to be the lesson to be drawn when
politicians such as Richard Gephardt scrap their pro-life position
before entering presidential politics. The liberal Justices of the Court
remain vigilant in their defense of abortion rights, even to the point of
striking down apparently constitutional postviability abortion restrictions."8 Establishment liberalism has long lent a sympathetic ear to
those to its ideological left, while holding in contempt those on the ideological and, especially, religious right; to be allied with Jerry Falwell

180.
181.
182.

See id.
See id.
See, e.g., C.

MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED

93-102 (1987). MacKinnon states:

The second issue . . . is . . . the moral rightness of abortion itself. My stance is that the

abortion choice must be legally available and must be women's, but not because the fetus is
not a form of life. In the usual argument, the abortion decision is made contingent on
whether the fetus is a form of life. I cannot follow that. Why should women not make life
or death decisions?
Id. at 94.
183. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
768-71, 807-12 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 822 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and against Gloria Steinem is probably more than the average liberal
can bear. Finally, there is the very real problem of repentance, and of
saving face. It is perhaps easier to look the fetus in the eye and call it a

nonperson than to look at oneself in the mirror and admit to complicity
in mass murder.
184

The recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
merely underscores the attachment of establishment liberalism to the
policy of abortion on demand. The liberal Justices are now willing to
defend the abortion right in absolutist language, as when Justice Blackmun declares that a previable fetus "cannot reasonably and objectively
be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman."18 It is ironic that Justice
Blackmun, who originally bottomed the abortion right on the supposedly unresolvable nature of the dispute concerning when life begins,
now is willing to categorically label the pro-life position on fetal rights
as objectively unreasonable. Whence comes Justice Blackmun's supposedly "objective" truth? In moving from a relativist to an absolutist defense of the abortion right, the liberal Justices have now all endorsed
the view that certain inherent fetal characteristics represent objective
determinants of fetal rights.1 86 The liberal Justices are giving only cursory, distorted attention to fetal characteristics;18 7 nonetheless, it is fas-

184. 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (July 3, 1989). It may be appropriate to disclose that the author coauthored an amicus brief in the Webster case in support of the State of Missouri. The brief was
submitted on behalf of the Southern Center for Law and Ethics.
185. See id. at 5040 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's use of language in this
key sentence is clearly meant to signal a belief that he is expressing demonstrable objective truth,
rather than subjective belief:
"The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development; it marks
that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and
cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct
from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman."
Id. (emphasis added).
186. This position was first advanced by Justice Stevens in his 1986 concurrence in Thornburgh, when he argued that the state's interest in fetal life "increases progressively and dramatically as the organism's capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its
surroundings increases day by day." 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring). Roe, as noted
supra, had only discussed the relational characteristic of viability, or capacity to survive; Stevens'
concurrence adds three inherent characteristics. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Webster, which was
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, specifically quotes and adopts Justice Stevens' belated
use of inherent fetal characteristics to defend the viability standard. See Webster, 57 U.S.L.W. at
5039-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. The Justices have named three relevant inherent fetal characteristics-abilities to feel
pleasure, to feel pain, and to react to surroundings-without ever discussing the technical and
sometimes contradictory research concerning at what times and to what degree the developing
fetus possesses these characteristics. The Justices also have failed to discuss the apparent fact that
the fetus possesses at least the capacity to react to its surroundings, and possibly the capacities to
feel pleasure and pain, prior to viability. See, e.g., Gianopoulos, Elias, Simpson & Tamura, Ultrasonic Assessment of Fetal Response to Second-Trimester Amniocentesis, 67 OBSTETRICS &
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cinating to watch legal relativists argue that certain "facts" about fetal
development objectively must lead all reasonable persons to certain legal conclusions about fetal rights. It seems that Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall are now the only sources of objective
truth in the Universe, having displaced God through their sweeping interpretation of the establishment clause.' 88
It is also noteworthy that at least three of the liberal Justices have
now accepted the feminist wisdom that the abortion right is necessary
to the equality of women.' 89 These Justices have therefore adopted the
inherently controversial view that gender equality requires the law to
minimize the impact of real gender differences, such as the fact that
only women can bear children. The implications of requiring the law to
undo the supposed harms created by inherent gender differences are
draconian and involve the Court in social engineering. The liberal Justices, as proud bearers of the liberal dream, are quite willing to remake
GYNECOLOGY 410-13 (1986)

(amniocentesis in the second trimester elicits a change in fetal
movement pattern).
188. Justice Stevens claims in his Webster dissent that there can be no secular interest in
protecting the potential life of an embryo, and thus that the Missouri preamble declaring that life
begins at fertilization contravenes the establishment clause of the Constitution. See 57 U.S.L.W.
at 5043-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It would certainly seem possible to take the apparently-secular position that the fertilized ovum, or zygote, is a genetically-distinct form of developing human
life that deserves state protection. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, implied that anti-sodomy statutes were unconstitutional under the establishment clause.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-12 & n.6 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
liberal Justices seem quite willing to employ a sweeping interpretation of the clause in order to
displace traditional Judeo-Christian morality.
189. This view is implied in the following passage from Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
in Thornburgh:
[T]he Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty
will be kept largely beyond the reach of government. That promise extends to women as
well as men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more
basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision . . . whether to end her
pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in
our view, would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law
guarantees equally to all.
476 U.S. at 772 (citations omitted).
While Justice Blackmun's Thornburgh opinion hints that the abortion right is necessary to
women's equality, his Webster dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, sounds like a
feminist tract:
Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper," the plurality discards a landmark case of the
last generation, and casts into darkness the hopes and visions of every woman in this country who had come to believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exercise
some control over her unique ability to bear children. The plurality does so either oblivious
or insensitive to the fact that millions of women, and their families, have ordered their lives
around the right to reproductive choice, and that this right has become vital to the full
participation of women in the economic and political walks of American life. The plurality
would clear the way again for the State to conscript a woman's body and to force upon her
a "distress life and future." Roe, 410 U.S., at 153.
Webster, 57 U.S.L.W. at 5041 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the world in their own image, the image of a brave new world, even as
they declare when convenient that truth and good are unknowable and
undefinable. 9" It would seem that declaring truth to be relative is a
convenient ruse for freeing the hidden arrogance and pride of human
rulers, for if truth is relative and God is unconstitutional then those
who are the ultimate arbiters of the social compact are absolutely uninhibited in their will to power.
The church has its own history of outrages. The voice of God is
often misheard; deeds done on His behalf are often merely reflections
of human depravity. A popular song once declared that "[t]oo many
people have died in the name of Christ for anyone to heed the
call" 19 -a profoundly silly thought. The call of God does not die, despite such misdeeds, because God and His call are severable from
man's distortion of that call. God has always been able to maintain His
good name on this earth despite the tomfoolery done in His name; He
has always ensured that the tomfoolery would not completely eclipse
the witness of those who, often at great cost, manage on the whole
(through His power) to glorify Him in their deeds. A merely secular
ideology, such as fascism, marxism, or American liberalism in the secular form that it has adopted, must by contrast always justify itself by a
purely utilitarian calculation of the good versus the evil done in the
name of that ideology. The Enlightenment tradition stripped itself of
any association with the Judeo-Christian tradition and begot a host of
competing secular ideologies, among which are marxism, feminism, and
liberalism. The value of those ideologies, and of the Enlightenment tradition itself, must surely be judged in the light of the crimes each has
committed and defended.

III.

CONCLUSION

My thesis is open to several additional objections. Some may argue
that employing the Judeo-Christian tradition in legal discourse violates
the spirit, if not the letter, of the religion clauses of the First Amend-

ment. The short answer to this objection begins with the observation

that the Supreme Court held in Harrisv. McRae"92 that the fact that a

law coincides with the doctrines of certain religious sects is not a basis
for its invalidation.

93

Nearly every religious purpose, whether it be

190. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("right" and
.wrong" in area of sexuality is relative and open to individual self-definition); Roe, 410
U.S. at
159-62 (Texas may not adopt one theory of life because medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at a consensus).
191.
CROSBY, STILLS & NASH, Cathedral, in CSN (1977).
192. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
193. 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); cf Bowen v. Kendrick, 56 U.S.L.W. 4818, 4822 n. 8,
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prohibiting abortion, promoting chastity, or feeding the poor, can be
separated from its religious roots and presented as a secular motivation.
The use of "religious motivation" as a criteria for judicial review is
inherently problematic. Christians, for example, are exhorted to do everything "in the name of the Lord Jesus." 194 Does this require a court to
invalidate every act of a legislature composed predominantly of believing Christians? How is a court to examine and characterize the motivations in the hearts of religious believers without impermissibly becoming entangled in religious questions?19 5
Nonetheless, we can ask what the proper decisional sources of
opinion are for a judge. The view that judges should decide profound
moral questions without reference to the foundational moral tradition
of our civilization is dangerous. Judges today are called upon to decide
such issues in areas where the law to be applied, whether constitutional, statutory, or common, is silent or ambiguous. Indeed, if the defeat of Judge Bork has any substantive meaning, it is that the American people expect the Supreme Court to exercise moral judgment in
safeguarding and defining our fundamental liberties, rather than
merely to enforce the morality of the framers and ratifiers. That moral
judgment will be most informed if conscious reflection on the JudeoChristian tradition is undertaken. The Supreme Court in framing fundamental law has sometimes spoken of "liberties that are deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition." '9 6 Those liberties cannot be
properly understood apart from the religious history and religious traditions of this nation. Indeed, it has been the task of this article to seek to
demonstrate that the attempt to understand those liberties in purely
secularized, abstracted terms has and will lead to the anomaly of tyranny that rules in the name of liberty.
A complete reply to objections based on the religion clause would
require an extensive exploration of the religion clauses. This is work for
another day. A further objection to my thesis is that the Judeo-Christian tradition for which I purport to speak is, as Alasdair Maclntyre
recently claimed, an "unfortunate fiction." '97 Clearly the term embraces a number of competing traditions, which the familiar trilogy
Protestant-Catholic-Jew only begins to describe. I have used the term
because I believe that the traditions it subsumes possess an important,

4824 (June 29, 1988).
194. Colossians 3:17.
195. For two recent explorations of the role of religious convictions in lawmaking, see Garvey, A Comment on Religious Conviction and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1288 (1986);
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1985).
196. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986).
197. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 32, at I1.
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central core, when placed in comparative reference to the secularized
Enlightenment tradition and its modern offshoot, the legal relativist
tradition. This common core is sufficient to provide a comon content
and common methodology in regard to American law. We can speak to
each other; we can speak to the meaning of America. Indeed, in some
ways the most significant dividing line among us relates to the extent
that we hold traditional, rather than liberal, or modernist, versions of
our faiths. Some adherents of the Judeo-Christian tradition have, I
would argue, so embraced modernist, relativist notions that they have
essentially abandoned the discourse, and the common core, of which I
speak. To the extent that we do not radically depart from the traditional forms of our faiths we must repudiate much of the dominant
mode of legal and intellectual discourse.
I do not mean to suggest that the common core of which I speak is
an adequate or complete language of faith, even in regard to the restricted subject of American law. Each of us can and should, where
necessary or helpful, speak from his or her own particular tradition.
This paper, for example, bears the marks of the Reformed Christian
tradition. It is not out of place to argue for the truth or validity Of a
certain Jewish or Christian tradition, or element of a tradition, as opposed to all other teachings. We need not speak in unison, but speak we
must.
It is inescapable that my thesis must address and affect different
readers in different ways. Even among adherents of theistic faiths, my
argument will produce varying reactions. Adherents of faiths that at
various stages of American history were excluded from the dominant
cultural discourse, or that today are numerically or culturally vulnerable, may instinctively shrink from any association of religion and law.
Several points in this regard can be made. First, the American commitment to religious freedom, in the sense of freedom for individuals and
communities to worship and practice their religion, is not seriously endangered by my thesis. Investigation would reveal, I think, that the
voluntary principle, which was embraced by the Evangelicals of the
nineteenth century,198 is theologically supported today by adherents of

198. See, e.g., G. MARSDEN, supra note 95, at 12-13 (discussing the evangelical acceptance
of the voluntary principle). Marsden describes the American voluntary principle in terms of the
realization that "if the church or any other group were to influence American society, it must
depend not on imposed authority, but rather on the voluntary response of the people." Id. at 12. In
using this term, I do not want to be understood as embracing the privatizing, individualistic views
which the term may currently evoke. See, e.g., W. ROOF & W. McKINNEY, supra note 114, at
140-71 (analyzing the "new voluntarism" in current American religious life). The term in its
more original sense refers to a certain relationship between church and state. Once the state
ceases to financially support certain religious organizations, and also ceases to restrict alternative
religious
all religious
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all the representatives of the traditional Jewish and Christian faiths,
except perhaps for a few fringe groups. This paper has described to
some degree the manner in which the relatively intolerant New England Puritans gradually were forced to come to terms with this principle, even before the Revolutionary era. The Reformed tradition, moreover, has long included other, more voluntaristic strains: the English
Puritan Independents, who during the 1640s criticized New England's
relative intolerance, and the Calvinistic Baptists, who presumably
shared the traditional Baptist desire for religious freedom. Thus, even
among Calvinists, the group most scorned for its supposed intolerance,
the theological foundations for religious freedom were laid long before
the birth of America as a nation. Indeed, it is the reclaiming of the
principle of religious freedom in theological, rather than Enlightenment, terms that will be most likely to safeguard it. If you require the
devout to abandon their beliefs for the sake of a merely secular freedom, you can always expect them to rebel from the mutilation of their
faith.
The mere guarantee of religious freedom, however, fails to satisfy
many members of minority religions. The issue is somewhat deeper:
what is required to be fully American? The issue is one of being, and of
feeling, included; the inclusion at issue is not mere citizenship but the
desire to belong, in the full cultural sense, in America. America as defined by the New Class appears to include everyone who wants to be
included. The cause of the New Class is freedom; the stance of the
New Class is neutrality. Vulnerable minorities of all kinds, including
religious minorities, may believe they are both safer, and more fully
participants, under the regime of the New Class.
This belief, I think, is largely incorrect. The freedom of the New
Class connotes a specific agenda, including the promotion of the abortion right and the elimination of traditional male and female roles. The
neutrality of the New Class is necessarily illusory: in the many public
conflicts which a society, through law and other means, must resolve,
there will be winners and losers; references to so-called fair procedures
cannot eliminate the responsibility for enacting rules of conflict which
favor one side or another. The claim of neutrality is a cover for a program that promotes the predominate interests and views of a certain
minority group, the New Class. The program of the New Class is at

its adherents. This form of voluntarism need not endorse the view that individuals do not owe a
religious duty to the organized church, or that religious views are so private and individualistic
that any use of them in public life is offensive and improper. Nor does the original form of the
voluntary principle contradict the insight that all people are morally obligated to worship their
Creator.
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base hostile to all forms of traditionalist religious culture, including,
ultimately, minority religious culture.
It is true, of course, that New Class members typically treat minority religious groups, no matter how absolutist in their beliefs, with a
certain tenderness and interest. It is also true that the New Class unleashes its full disdain upon religious movements that are powerful
enough to threaten it. The New Class thus can appear to serve as the
defender of minority religion, protecting it from the powerful forces of
majoritarian religion. It is a mistake, however, to believe that traditionalist members of minority groups can really be full participants in the
New Class power structure; the relationship of the New Class to minority religion must rather be one of paternalism and corrosion. The
New Class displays a kind of protective paternalism toward non-threatening absolutist minorities, but the New Class contempt for traditional
forms of religious belief lead it to regard such groups as immature. It is
assumed that in time the forces of modernity, which are most
powerfully unleashed under the New Class regime, will corrode the traditionalist beliefs of minority religious groups. This "maturation" will
lead, of course, to the destruction of minority religious culture.
Many minority faiths, by contrast, are historically brother faiths
to the culturally dominant faiths. The common core of traditionalist
theistic belief suggests an opportunity for at least some minority faiths
to make a substantial contribution in the public realm of law and values, in an America governed under religious, rather than relativist,
principles.
There is no denying, however, that vigorous majoritarian religion
poses grave risks for minority religion, even in a society devoted to religious freedom. The theological and cultural differences that divide minority and majority faiths in the Catholic-Protestant-Jewish-Muslim 9 9
spectrum are quite significant, and one cannot ask adherents of such
traditionalist faiths to give up their claims to truth and their efforts to
convince others of those claims. In this sense, given the free marketplace of competing religious ideas, minority religious groups are always
at risk in America. Surely the answer to this dilemma, even for vulnerable religious groups, is not to destroy the public legitimacy of all
claims to religious truth. Arguably, at least, minority religious groups

199. I have not previously discussed Islam, obviously one of the world's important monotheistic faiths; I mention it in this context because it is an increasingly important minority faith in
America, and because it clearly shares a great deal with the Jewish and Christian faiths which
historically have played a much greater role in American life. I am not prepared at this time to
discuss the relationship of Islam to the term Judeo-Christian tradition, nor am I ready to discuss
the larger issues presented by the growth of Islam in America. These issues are, of course, deserving of serious treatment.
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are at greater risk in the long run under the New Class regime than
they would be under a regime of, for example, Evangelical and Catholic America.
One cannot legitimately speak for others; adherents of minority
religious faiths are entitled to cast their lot with whomever they please.
Thus, the final response to those of a culturally vulnerable religious
faith is that they simply do not have the right to demand that the majority faiths abandon their desire to live in a society that reflects, in its
laws and other public domains, the religious faith of the majority. The
law has to reflect someone's value orientation; America has to mean
something. The most appropriate place from which to draw these values and meanings is from the historically and culturally dominant beliefs of the people. Tyranny of the minority is also a form of tyranny.
The audience that is likely to respond most negatively to my thesis
are those members of the New Class who have embraced the dominant
relativist mindset. In a sense, my argument has been addressed primarily to them; I have tried to argue in their language and their terms.
Yet, I can have no illusions that the argument will be persuasive to
many of this mindset. The thesis I uphold is simply too repugnant to
relativist sensibilities. Many believe that abortion is a necessary right
and that the rights of women outweigh the rights of the fetus, however
defined. They perceive continuing vitality and progress in the great liberal modernist project. They deplore the reentry of Christianity into
public life in any form that does not simply affirm the secular liberal
agenda; they can understand the continued vitality of theologically conservative Christianity primarily as a reflection of the reactionary, backward nature of American culture. Many would be far more comfortable in a Western European or Scandinavian context, where the beliefs
of the people regarding traditional religion and morality are far closer
to those of the American New Class. They hope for a maturing of
America.
They also may ask: how can we, as nonbelievers, access and use
the Judeo-Christian perspective? Even if they accept the Judeo-Christian tradition as one legitimate authority in American legal discourse,
they may see themselves as profoundly ill-suited to employ that
tradition.
Several final points can be addressed to this group. First, the
nonbeliever is clearly capable of comprehending the teachings of the
Judeo-Christian tradition regarding the nature of God, man, law, and
society; the nonbeliever also can comprehend the contrast between the
Judeo-Christian teachings, and those of the Enlightenment tradition.
One need not accept the truth or validity of a tradition in order to
obtain a basic comprehension of that tradition's teachings. Unbelievers
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss3/2
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are not, as scholars or attorneys, excluded from legal discourse that
employs the perspective of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Many scholars will not be inclined to employ a tradition they find
distasteful. One cannot expect, nor does one want, opponents of a tradition to be its primary interpreters. Nonetheless, one can ask of those
opponents, in fairness, a great deal. One can ask them, in view of the
historical and cultural importance of the Judeo-Christian tradition, to
refrain from what amounts to a silencing or censorship of that tradition
in the domain of legal discourse. This censorship takes several forms.
First, there is a general denial of the legitimacy of the Judeo-Christian
tradition in legal discourse, except perhaps as might occupy the periphery in the form of an occasional seminar or possibly a few specialized
journals. Relativists should be willing finally to concede that the socalled neutrality they advocate, which they claim renders authoritative
use of the Judeo-Christian materials improper, is in fact advocacy of a
specific position or tradition that is competitive with the Judeo-Christian tradition. They may prefer their own relativist method of discourse, and believe the competition to be wrong and dangerous; nonetheless, that does not make the competing form of discourse either
intellectually or culturally illegitimate.
Second, one may make a plea for the admission of the opposing
camp into the profession. It is ironic, and yet predictable, that despite
pleas for intellectual diversity, adherents of the traditional forms of the
historically and culturally dominant faiths of the American people are
virtually absent from most American law faculties. The accepted voices
of faith are generally those who propound a modernist version compatible with the relativist agenda. The censorship of the Judeo-Christian
tradition is often accomplished through the exclusion of its more faithful spokesmen.
In surveying the implications of my thesis for various audiences, I
must finally return to that small but significant group of Christian
scholars with whom I most identify. If my thesis is to have meaning,
the work-despite prejudice, despite opposition-must be largely carried out by this group. Too many have been content to relegate their
faiths to their private lives, while moving quietly and safely amongst
their colleagues. Too many have internalized the message of their colleagues, and swallowed the myth of neutrality.
Professor James Neuchterlein recently published a thoughtful article in The American Scholar that recounted his own experiences as a
Christian scholar and teacher in the context of discussing the development of Lutheran Valparaiso University. In closing the article, he
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It is the irony of the situation of those who inhabit the Christian
university today that they indulge in such fugitive and idiosyncratic reflections as these in full realization that they are unlikely in the extreme
to have any significant effect in the larger culture. It is difficult under
conditions of radical cultural pluralism to sustain illusions of a restored
intellectual Christendom. I stay at Valparaiso University because I believe in it and I love it

. .

. not because in remaining here I think I have

enlisted on the winning side. But that's not really the point. T.S. Eliot
had it right: for us there is only the trying; the rest is not our business.20
Professor Neuchterlein's statement reflects the difficulty of living
out a life as a Christian scholar in an age where the term is considered
self-contradictory, and where the intellectual enterprise is dominated
by a relativist, anti-theistic modernism. As this paper makes clear, I
believe that he overstates the cultural pluralism of America. I believe
that the defeatism he and many other Christian scholars experience
comes from a disconnectedness with the larger world of American history and culture. Christian scholars must remember that they represent
a vast throng of people; indeed, believing Christians are probably the
most underrepresented group in the academy. Relativist New Class
members are historically newcomers and remain numerically a minority; culturally they remain out of step with the people. Immersion in
the world of academia, and in the mass culture controlled by the New
Class, can blind us to these fundamental facts. We are privileged to
have been placed in vocations where we can break the hegemony of the
relativist mindset; we are privileged to represent the faithful in these
highly influential arenas. The battle will be lost if it is never joined.
On the other hand, I do not want to be critical of Professor
Neuchterlein, because he (and T.S. Elliot) did get it essentially right:
"[Flor us there is only the trying; the rest is not our business." We are,
however, on the winning side: the victory will be accomplished by God
in the time, and with the means, that He has appointed.

200. Neuchterlein, Athens and Jerusalem in Indiana,
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